The Solicitors Journal.

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CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE WAS a ridiculous statement in Wednesday evening's papers, founded, we believe, upon a telegram sent to the Royal Courts, that Mr. Baron HUDDLESTON was in imminent danger. The learned judge came to town on Thursday, and, we are glad to learn, is fast advancing towards complete recovery.

THE REPORT of the committee appointed by the Lord Chancellor "to inquire into the subject of the existing rules as to the distribution of business in the courts and chambers of the Chancery Division, and the distribution of the clerical staff," has at last been published. We have discussed the main recommendations of the committee in another column, and we need here only draw attention to the fact that the committee has "felt constrained, some with reluctance, but now with an earnest conviction, to recommend that an additional judge be appointed to the Chancery Division, and that the same staff of clerks be attributed to each of the judges." We have urged the adoption of this course for years, and there would seem to be now no excuse for delay in adopting it. Nevertheless, great is the Treasury, and it will probably prevail.

THE ARMS ACT (Ireland) Continuance Bill has not received the Royal assent before the 1st of June, on which day the Peace Preservation (Ireland) Act, 1881, which is the statutory title of the Arms Act, expired by virtue of the 8th section. It is not, perhaps, generally known that, by virtue of an Act passed in 1808 "to remedy the inconvenience which has arisen and may arise from the expiration of Acts before the passing of Acts to continue the same" (48 Geo. 3, c. 106, Chit. Stat. vol. 1, tit. "Act of Parliament"), the delay of a few days is of less consequence than it would otherwise have been. By this statute it is enacted that, "where any Bill may have been or shall be introduced into the present or any future session of Parliament for the continuance of any Act which would expire in such session, and such Act shall have expired before the Bill for continuing the same shall have received the Royal assent, such continuing Act shall be deemed and taken to have effect from the date of the expiration of the Act intended to be continued . . . as if such continuing Act had actually passed before the expiration of such Act"; but, for the purpose of preventing an obvious injustice, it is added that "nothing herein contained shall extend to affect any person with any punishment, penalty, or forfeiture by reason of anything done or omitted to be done by any such person contrary to the provisions of the Act continued between the expiration of the same and the date at which the Act continuing the same may have received the Royal assent." Any proclamation, therefore, prohibiting the carrying of arms in the proclaimed district, or any alteration of any order or proclamation already made, if issued under the Act of 1881, between the 1st of June and the date of passing of the Continuance Bill, would have the same force as if the Continuance Bill had already passed.

THE COMMUNICATION of a correspondent last week, relating to the county court sign-board which he told us he had discovered "within eleven miles from Chancery-lane," has excited a good deal of interest. We have great confidence in our correspondent's accuracy, but we think, on consideration, that it is hardly desirable, by revealing the precise locality of the court outside which he said the sign-board was fixed up, to send off our readers on a pilgrimage in search of a thing of beauty, which, alas, like other earthly joys, is likely to be of a transitory nature. We have reason to believe that, in the opinion of the authorities, the time is hardly ripe for legal sign-boards, and before our readers could make the pilgrimage, the interesting object may have disappeared. Moreover, apart from this, it is obvious that the form of sign-board given by our correspondent is of a very imperfect character. If the local fount of justice is to share with the local beer tap the distinction of a sign-board, there ought, at least, to be an attempt to preserve the well-established characteristics of these institutions. It is contrary to all precedent to give the names of the persons willing to assist customers to the article supplied and to omit any description of the article. Moreover, what is a hostelry without a distinctive name? The county court sign-board of the future should clearly be headed with some appropriate title, to be prescribed from time to time by the registrar. Such titles as "The Black Bore" should be avoided, as being capable of misconstruction, but there remains a large class of pleasant and attractive names. Then there should follow a terse description of the article supplied. Following well-established precedent, this description should take the form of "Judge ———'s Celebrated Sparkling [or Entire] Fount of Justice"—and then might follow the particulars given by our correspondent.

THE AMENDMENTS to be proposed in committee on the Railway and Canal Traffic Bill have greatly increased in number since we last commented upon them, but the only additional amendment of substantial importance is that which stands in the name of Mr. BARCLAY, by which that member proposes to substitute a completely new clause of his own for clause 24, relating to the revision of maximum rates. Mr. BARCLAY proposes to throw the chief labour of preparing a new classification upon the Railway Commissioners, who are to prepare a "complete classification applicable to all railways in the United Kingdom, or if the commissioners find that one uniform classification is, with due regard to the interests of the public and of the railway companies, impracticable, a separate classification of goods for each railway and group of railways." We have little doubt that one uniform classification—that adopted in the Railway Clearing House—would be found practicable. The commissioners are also to prepare a schedule of maximum rates for each class of goods "varying with the distance or otherwise, as the commissioners may think expedient." We do not think that, looking to the different cost of the different lines, one uniform set of maximum rates would be fair, and injustice does not appear to be sufficiently guarded against by the proposed direction that, "in preparing the schedules, the commissioners shall settle the maximum rates as shall appear to them to be reasonable and just." Some more specific rules would be needed for the guidance of the commissioners if the revision should be entrusted to them. The commissioners, it is added, before finally settling the classifications and schedules, are to give notice to the public and to the railway companies of their proposals, and are to consider any objections made. The conclusion of the whole matter appears to be that the commissioners are to "report to Parliament," and there is no provision imposing on the Board of Trade, or any other public department, any obligation to bring in a Bill based on the report of the commissioners. If strengthened by this and other amendments, Mr. BARCLAY's scheme appears to be a fairly good one.

THE PROCESS of "differing *totis viribus*" (as Lord COLERIDGE expresses it) from the decisions of the Court of Appeal is not unknown on the High Court bench. It is a very natural, if not a particularly decorous or convenient, practice. There are practitioners who will recall a certain court in which the relations

between the bench and certain members of the inner bar somewhat resembled those between the bull and the *toreadors* in a Spanish bullfight. But, in place of the small dart of the Spanish *toreador*, the weapon employed by the learned tormentor was the use of some such formula as the following:—"I come next to the case of *Jones* v. *Jones*, in which, as your Honour will no doubt remember, your Honour's decision was reversed by the Lords Justices." This seldom failed to elicit a "differing *totis viribus*" which, if a certain House of Lords reporter had been present, might have been enshrined in a headnote as follows:—"*Semble, per* ——, V.C.—The Lords Justices are fools." Happily, however, the reporters usually turned a deaf ear to the observations as to the merits of the Appeal Court; the observations were terse, and did not materially delay the business of the court. Reporters and judges nowadays are less considerate. Lord COLERIDGE, who we remember once estimated the value of the public time in the Common Pleas Division at ten shillings a minute, a few weeks ago occupied a large amount of the public time by the delivery of an elaborate attack on the Court of Appeal, whom he accused of having "unnecessarily, and therefore mischievously, interfered with the discretion of the judges"—an interference which, he stigmatized as "a partial impediment to the due administration of justice, and an addition to the difficulties and expenses of the suitor." These observations were duly published in the *Times* for the edification of the public at large. The learned Lord Chief Justice has followed up this attack by the delivery, last week, of some observations on the amount of knowledge and experience possessed by judges of the Court of Appeal. Counsel having referred to the case of *Solomon* v. *Bitton* (L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 176), which was decided by the late Sir GEORGE JESSEL, M.R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ., Lord COLERIDGE, according to the *Times*, took occasion to remark that "the case cited had been decided by three judges, of two of whom it might be said with all respect, that, though most acute and learned men, they knew no more of the practice at *Nisi Prius* than men who had been called [to the bar] two days." One cannot help recalling Lord Bacon's BACON'S advice on swearing in Mr. Justice HUTTON:—"Let your speech be with gravity, as one of the sages of the law, and not talkative, nor with impertinent flying out."

A NOVEL QUESTION of evidence in connection with the subject of dying declarations had to be considered not long ago by a full bench of judges of the High Court at Allahabad [in *Empress* v. *Abdullah* (1 L. R. 7 All. 385)]. On a trial for murder it appeared that the deceased woman had, at a time when she had lost the power of speech, but when, according to the medical testimony, she was still able to understand what was said to her, been questioned as to the injuries inflicted upon her and as to the perpetrator of them, and had made with her hand certain signs as to the nature of her wounds, and had nodded affirmatively when the prisoner's name was mentioned. The question argued before the High Court was whether the signs made by the woman could be admitted against the prisoner as dying declarations, and great stress was laid upon the terms of section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, which enumerates the different cases in which hearsay statements by deceased or absent persons are admissible. This section goes far beyond the English rule of evidence as to dying declarations by admitting, "whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding, . . . statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts, made by a person who is dead, . . . as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death." The judges concurred in admitting the evidence, though upon different grounds. The Chief Justice (Sir W. PETHERAM) and two of his colleagues held that the questions put to the deceased and the signs made by her in answer thereto, amounted, when taken together, to "verbal statements" as to the cause of death within section 32. He thought that "verbal" was a phrase of wider signification than "oral," and that it meant "by means of words," and not solely by means of words "spoken by the mouth." Mr. Justice STRAIGHT took the same view, declining to draw "a purely technical distinction" between assent expressed by saying "yes," and assent expressed by nodding the head. Mr. Justice MAHMOOD held the signs to be inadmissible under section 32, because he could not interpret the term "verbal" as meaning anything but "by means of a word or words"; but he admitted them under section 8 of the same statute, which states that "the conduct of any person, an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if such conduct influences, or is influenced by, any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto." The signs made by the deceased, against whom the offence was charged, appeared to be clearly a part of her "conduct," and to have been influenced by the homicidal act, which was the "fact in issue." From all which it may be gathered that legal subtlety is not the exclusive prerogative of the English bench.

WE REPORTED last week a decision of the Court of Appeal on a point in the law of distress which it is very odd should not previously have been directly determined. The facts were that the defendants let a dry dock to GILBERT at a certain rent. GILBERT contracted with FRANCE to build him a ship, to be paid for by instalments as the ship advanced towards completion. After some of the instalments had been paid, but before the ship was finished, the defendants distrained upon the ship for rent in arrear due by GILBERT. The action was brought by the executors of FRANCE for an illegal distress, and it was contended that the ship was exempt from distress within the rule laid down in *Simpson* v. *Hartopp* (Willes, 512), that "things delivered to a person exercising a trade to be wrought or manufactured in the way of his trade" are exempt from distress. We should have thought that there could be no doubt upon the point, either upon authority or principle. The result of the cases relating to exemption from distress on this ground was stated by ALDERSON, B., in *Muspratt* v. *Gregory* (3 M. & W. 678), as being that "where, *in order that the trade may be exercised*, it becomes necessary that goods [of the customer] should be delivered into the custody of the person carrying it on, the law, in consideration of the benefit which the commonwealth derives from the carrying on of the trade, protects from distress the goods so delivered." The reason for the rule is plain: no one would send his goods to a trader to be wrought or have labour bestowed on them if they were liable to distress by the trader's landlord. But the application of this reason is confined to goods actually delivered to a trader to have labour or skill bestowed on them; and it is obvious that if the exemption were extended to goods ordered to be made or procured by a trader for a customer, there would be an end to distress on the goods of traders.

A judge's first charge is thus reported by the American *Medical and Surgical Reporter*: He said, "Gentlemen of the jury, charging a jury is a new business to me, as this is my first case. You have heard all the evidence as well as myself; you have also heard what the learned counsel have said. If you believe what the counsel for the plaintiff has told you your verdict will be for the plaintiff; but if, on the other hand, you believe what the defendant's counsel have told you, then you will give a verdict for the defendant. But if you are like me, and don't believe what either of them has said, then I don't know what you will do. Constable, take charge of the jury."

On the 27th ult., in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor moved that Standing Order 128, which provides that no interest out of capital should be paid on calls under Railway Bills, be vacated, and that a new Standing Order recommended by the Select Committee be adopted in lieu thereof. He stated that the new Standing Order followed substantially the Standing Order adopted by the House of Commons two years ago. It contained stringent provisions with regard to the interest to be allowed, the time during which it was to be allowed, when it was to begin, and the conditions of subscription of capital under which a loan was to be allowed. It was made perfectly clear that the notice of a company having power so to pay interest must be given in every prospectus, advertisement, or other document of the company inviting subscriptions for shares, and in every certificate of shares.

At the Warwick Assizes, after the trial of a charge for feloniously demolishing a dwelling-house had proceeded some little time, Mr. Justice Mathew said it must necessarily last more than the day, and gave directions for accommodation to be provided for the jury for the night, telling them that, under the present absurd state of the law, he could not allow them to separate, the case being one of felony. Thereupon, counsel for the defence said that he intended, at the end of the case for the prosecution, to submit that the charge of felony could not be maintained. Mr. Justice Mathew accepted this view, and ruled that the charge must be reduced to the misdemeanour of riotously doing damage to the premises. The trial accordingly proceeded for misdemeanour only and the jury were allowed to separate.

THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CHANCERY BUSINESS.

RUMOUR did not exaggerate in stating that the committee appointed by the Lord Chancellor to inquire into the subject of the existing rules as to the distribution of business in the courts and chambers of the Chancery Division, and the distribution of the clerical staff, had not come to a unanimous conclusion. All the ten members of the committee, it is true, signed the report, but five of them give reasons why they dissent from it in various particulars. The report is supplemented by these notes of dissent and by a series of forty-one resolutions. Most of these resolutions which were capable of being carried out by means of rules, have been adopted, and are embodied in the Rules of the Supreme Court of December, 1885, and are already in operation. As to the report itself, it would have been desirable that an absolutely unanimous conclusion should have been arrived at, and much of the force of the recommendations is taken away by the fact that the only two judges of the Chancery Division who were on the committee, Mr. Justice Kay and Mr. Justice Pearson, disagree with material portions of them. Unfortunately, too, the report is weakened to some extent by the following words, which are to be found in the opening passage:—"The conclusions to which we have come are based partly upon the evidence produced before us, and *more* on the knowledge of facts possessed by many of the committee." The meaning of this is, no doubt, that the conclusions do not always follow the evidence.

The first point dealt with is the mode by which actions and matters are distributed by ballot among the several judges of the division, and this, the committee recommend, should be altered. It appears by the evidence of a gentleman in the Central Office, who gives some rather amusing details of efforts made by solicitors' clerks to get their writs or summonses marked for the judge of their choice, that, instead of there being one ballot-box for the whole of the Central Office, there are, in fact, six ballot-boxes, and, therefore, as many chances or risks of inequality of distribution. Moreover, when a solicitor brings his writ and a certificate according to the form 19, appendix A 1, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, that the case is connected with another before a particular judge, and ought to be marked for him, the judge in question gets that case, in addition to such as are marked for him in the order of his rotation. The plan adopted by the registrars in balloting for conveyancing council, examiners of the court, and official referees is that, when any case is marked, as it sometimes is, for a particular individual, his name is removed from the ballot for a whole drawing for each time this occurs, with the result that, when the whole of the names are drawn, there comes a time, sooner or later, when each one has precisely the same number of cases sent to him. This plan, if adopted at the Central Office, together with the use of one ballot-box instead of six, would greatly help to equalize the work of the several judges; but nothing can, it is apprehended, be done to effectually distribute the heavy cases and the light cases so as to bring about absolute equality. The committee do not recommend this plan, though they advise an alteration, having come to the conclusion that the present mode of distribution, adopted with the object of insuring equality, has failed in that object, and has produced inconvenience and mischief.

The most important recommendation made by the committee is that an additional judge should be appointed, and that the then six judges of the Chancery Division should have a staff of clerks attributed to each. They would distribute the existing twelve chief clerks among the six judges. The subject of the distribution of the court business between the six judges has been the great difficulty with which the committee have had to contend. They think that the nature of the litigation proper to the Chancery Division makes it advisable that the carrying out of a decree, or of causes involving the continuous management of property, should be continued before the same judge; and they do not advocate any method of distribution which would prevent causes from being assigned to a judge. All the members of the committee are not impressed with the importance of this, though the strong opinion of many of their number, and of all the witnesses they have examined, is in its favour, and also in favour of the advantage to suitors of the leading counsel attaching themselves to particular courts. On the subject of the appointment of another judge of the Chancery Division, and on this alone, the opinions are unanimous; where they split is on the question of the division of the work.

The desire that witness actions should be heard continuously is exhibited in the scheme of the committee as well as in the alternative scheme of Mr. Justice Pearson. The former would commence by a new mode of assigning the causes and matters—namely, by the action of a responsible officer instead of by ballot. Such an officer would, say the committee, have the means of learning, and would be instructed to learn, the nature, as to length and otherwise, of causes and matters, and to distribute them accordingly. Anyone knowing what such an officer could learn at the time of the issue of a writ or of an originating summons, would not admit that his acquisition of knowledge would enable him even to make a good guess, in the majority of cases, how long they would take to hear and decide. The committee's scheme proposes to link the new judge and the five existing judges together in pairs, with, it would appear, a staff of chief clerks to each judge or to each pair, and that the new judge shall sit in chambers two days in a week, and that four other of the judges shall each sit in chambers one day in the week for the whole day. Then, every day in the week, there are to be three judges hearing witness actions for the whole of the week, while the other three take the other business.

Mr. Justice Pearson naturally points out the inconvenience to suitors if each judge has a motion day or petition day only once a fortnight. His proposal for utilizing the services of the sixth judge is that only five of the judges shall sit in court at one time, and that each judge in rotation shall sit continuously for a month in chambers.

If a suggestion might be respectfully offered as an alternative scheme, which would afford some of the advantages of both the rival schemes, it would be as follows:—Let three or more courts be told off for the continuous hearing of witness actions, and let the judges arrange for themselves a rota of such an elastic fashion that the judge of each court should be changed, or, alternatively, that the list of the day should go to another judge after a certain number of cases had been disposed of, or after a certain time had been occupied; it being always understood that a judge who began a case would hear it out from day to day until its completion. If the scheme of which the above is but a rough sketch were adopted, then the proposal of the committee, that all business in the action subsequent to judgment should go before the chief clerks attached to the judge delivering the judgment, could be usefully brought into operation. Again, no case need ever stand over for three days by reason of the intervention of interlocutory business, which would be taken in the courts or before the judges not for the time being employed in hearing witness actions; the fruitful cause of expense by the detention of witnesses would be reduced to a minimum, and we venture to think that, with one list of witness causes instead of one for each judge, the business would be disposed of more rapidly by the means above indicated than by any other we have heard mentioned.

On the subject of officers of the court, there appears to be a strong desire on the part of some members of the committee to have all the business now disposed of by the registrars and taxing masters handed over to the chief clerks. This would be only to call registrars and taxing masters by another name. The business they now transact must be done by someone, and the chief clerks are already fully occupied, and, indeed, often over-pressed with their present work. Moreover, although the committee, as a body, seem bent upon this change, Mr. Justice Pearson, for one, sets his face against it, and the witnesses who speak upon the subject say it would be inconvenient. The only other point calling for special mention here is the objection of the committee to the system of appointments before the chief clerks, and their recommendation that all summonses should be divided among the chief clerks, and should be placed in lists like the daily cause lists, and should be disposed of in their order, quite regardless of whether they are heavy or light. Any member of the profession can form an opinion on this suggestion, and it may, without hesitation, be pronounced an utterly unworkable one. To mix up the heavy appointments with the light would frequently cause the breakdown of the list. Solicitors would become tired of waiting, and, having other appointments, would be compelled to leave matters to be dealt with by a junior clerk, whose incompetence would often necessitate an

adjournment on the particular case coming on, and so the present evil would be aggravated.

It would serve no useful purpose to refer here *seriatim* to the details of the forty-one resolutions adopted by the committee. Those of them which have been embodied in the Rules of December, 1885, have not commended themselves without exception to the members of the profession, and the remainder are, in substance, embodied in the recommendations of the report.

COVENANTS FOR PAYMENT AND THE BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882.

It will never, we venture to predict, be seriously said of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, as Lord Nottingham said of the Statute of Frauds, that every line of it is worth a subsidy; it may, however, at some future day, be as true to affirm of the former, as it has long been of the latter Act, that every line of it has cost a subsidy, for hardly a week passes without our courts being called upon to solve some new riddle arising out of this latest instalment of bills of sale legislation. Of these riddles, the most striking feature is that they promise to be no less prolific of further independent litigation than they are themselves remarkable for startling novelty, as may be gathered from *Davies* v. *Rees* (*ante*, p. 483), which came before the Court of Appeal on the 14th inst., and with the doctrine in which we propose to deal in the present article.

In that case the question raised was whether section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, in avoiding a bill of sale for non-compliance with the schedule form, avoids the instrument, not merely in respect of the chattels thereby granted, but also in respect of the covenants for payment of principal and interest therein contained. The facts were as follows:—A bill of sale to secure a loan and interest at the rate of fifty-eight per cent. was given, with the usual covenants for payment of the same, and was subsequently assigned by the grantee, of which assignment the grantor had due notice. The grantor having fallen in arrear with his payments, the assignee entered and sold the chattels comprised in the bill of sale for an amount insufficient to satisfy the principal of the loan. Thereupon an action was brought by the grantor for damages and an injunction against the assignee, to which the latter set up a counter-claim on the covenant in the bill of sale and for money lent. It being admitted that the bill of sale was void under section 9 of the Act of 1882, it was held by the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., Bowen and Fry, L.JJ.) that the covenant for payment in the bill of sale was also void. In dismissing the appeal, Lord Esher, M.R., said that "a bill of sale which was not in the form given in the schedule was bad, and that the whole of it was void. That form contained a covenant for payment of the money, and that covenant could only be regarded as part of the bill of sale. Where the Legislature had desired to limit the effect of the provisions of the Act to bills of sale, in so far as they were assurances of chattels only, it had done so; but in the sections which enact that all bills of sale shall be in the form given in the schedule or be void, there was no such limitation. Therefore, the whole of this bill of sale must be held void." In concurring, Bowen, L.J., added that "no doubt the mere fact that a void bill of sale was written on the same piece of paper with other matters or contracts did not avoid everything else that had been written thereon. The argument that the covenant in this case was independent of the assignment of chattels, and that the latter only was to be considered as void, was negatived by the different expressions used in the Act which the Master of the Rolls had referred to, though he had some doubt at first whether, in so loosely drawn an Act, that conclusion was unavoidable."

From these judgments it will be seen that a distinction is recognized by the Court of Appeal between such provisions of the Act as merely refer to the chattels comprised in a bill of sale and such provisions as deal with the form of a bill of sale—in fact, non-compliance with provisions of the former description, which may be styled limited provisions, avoids a bill of sale in part; non-compliance with provisions of the latter description, which may be styled general provisions, avoids a bill of sale *in toto*. Under the class of limited provisions fall sections 4, 5, and 8; under the class of general provisions fall sections 9 and 12. Sections 4 and 5 declare that a bill of sale shall be void, except as against the grantor, in respect, respectively, of any personal chattels not specifically described in a schedule thereto, or of any personal chattels, although so described, of which the grantor was not the true owner at the time of the execution of the bill of sale; section 8 declares that a bill of sale shall be void in respect of the personal chattels comprised therein unless (1) it be duly attested; (2) be registered under the Act of 1878 within seven clear days after its execution, or, if executed out of England, within seven clear days after it would, in the ordinary course of post, arrive in England if posted immediately after its execution; and (3) truly set forth the consideration for which it was given. Section 8, it will be observed, avoids a bill of sale against all the world, whilst sections 4 and 5 avoid a bill of sale against all the world except the grantor; apart from this distinction, the common effect of all these limited provisions is to avoid a bill of sale in so far only as the personal chattels therein contained are concerned; covenants for payment of the sum secured, or other stipulations not affecting the goods in question, are in no way touched (*Roberts* v. *Roberts*, 32 W. R. 605, L. R. 13 Q. B. D. 794; *Crosser and another* v. *Maxwell; Consolidated, &c., Corporation, Claimants*, W. N. (1885), 95.

To pass next to what we have above designated as general provisions of the Act, section 9 is in the following terms:—"A bill of sale made or given by way of security for the payment of money by the grantor thereof shall be void unless made in accordance with the form in the schedule to this Act annexed"; and section 12 is as follows:—"Every bill of sale made or given in consideration of any sum under £30 shall be void." In both these sections the avoidance of a bill of sale is equally without reservation; the question, and the only question upon the operation of that avoidance, is—In how comprehensive a sense is the term bill of sale to be understood? Now *Davies* v. *Rees*, as we have already seen, expressly decides that section 9 extends to the covenant for payment in a bill of sale; that covenant is an integral part of the schedule form, and, therefore, goes with the form; and so, we apprehend, will also go every other covenant or stipulation which falls within the language or scope of the schedule form. Suppose, however, some provision altogether outside the schedule form—some provision, it may be, which *per se* vitiates a bill of sale—can such a provision be upheld if the bill of sale is invalid? In answer to this query a distinction must, we conceive, be taken between a provision which, if not an actual part, is yet but an accessory of the subject of a bill of sale, and a provision which deals with a substantive matter altogether outside such subject. A provision of the former character must, according to the maxim, *Omne accessorium cedit principali*, stand or fall with the bill of sale to which it is annexed; thus, a covenant by the grantor to transfer to the grantee certain goods not comprised in the bill of sale, in the event of non-payment of the money thereby secured on a given day, cannot, we submit, be enforced if the bill of sale be declared void. A provision of the latter character, on the other hand, is, in fact, a separate and independent transaction, and cannot, therefore, be affected by the invalidity of a bill of sale with which it is only physically connected by the same paper or parchment; thus, the title of a mortgagee to realty mortgaged along with personalty by the same deed cannot, we suggest, as a rule, be impugned by avoidance of the personalty mortgage, under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882. We say as a rule, because cases can be put where real property may be regarded as merely ancillary to personal property comprised in the same mortgage, and in such cases it would, perhaps, be hazardous to assert that the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, could not affect the whole subject of mortgage; thus, on a mortgage of a workshop and trade machinery attached thereto, as defined by section 5 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, it might be a question whether avoidance of the mortgage, under the Act of 1882, as to the machinery, would not also be avoidance of the mortgage as to the workshop.

Waiving this point, the difficulty of a mortgage of realty and personalty containing but a single covenant for payment of principal and interest presents itself. Does the doctrine in *Davies* v. *Rees* apply to avoid such covenant absolutely, in case the mortgage of personalty is avoided by section 9 of the Act of 1882? or can the covenant be, as it were, split in two, and attributed, in one aspect, as part of the realty mortgage, and, therefore, good as to that; and, in the other aspect, as part of the personalty mortgage,

and, therefore, only bad as to that? The answer, we think, is plain where either different principal sums are secured, or where, though the same principal is secured, different rates of interest are secured, on the different properties; in both these cases avoidance of the personalty mortgage could not, in our view, prejudice the covenant for payment of principal and interest, so far as the realty mortgage was concerned. Where, however, one principal sum, at the same rate of interest, is secured by a mortgage of realty and personalty, and there is but one common covenant for payment thereof, it appears to us that avoidance of the personalty mortgage under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, may possibly avoid the common covenant altogether. This, it must be confessed, is an *apex juris* upon which we would fain, for the present, pronounce no definite opinion. Meantime we exhort the practitioner to be on the safe side, and to avoid complex mortgages of realty and personalty in the same instrument, or, if it is necessary to employ such mortgages, to repeat the covenants for payment and keep the provisions relating to the several subjects mortgaged as distinct as possible.

RECENT DECISIONS.

INDORSEMENT OF PLEADINGS BY LONDON AGENT.

(*Re Scholes*, Pearson, J., 34 W. R. 515.)

The doctrine of *Wray* v. *Kemp* (32 W. R. 334, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 169), that a London solicitor acting as agent in issuing a writ of summons must state that he issues it as agent, was applied in this case to a London firm of solicitors, who, acting as agents for a country firm, presented a petition for taxation of costs indorsed with their own name only, and not describing them as agents for the country firm. It was stated by counsel that the parties knew that the London firm were acting as agents for the country firm, and that, therefore, it did not matter whether the London firm indorsed the petition as agents or not; but Mr. Justice Pearson considered himself bound by the decision in *Wray* v. *Kemp*, which he described as being that "a London firm, when acting as agents, ought not to use their own name as if acting as solicitors for clients." He, therefore, discharged the order made on the petition for taxation, but declined to give costs on either side.

REVIEWS.

LEADING CASES IN EQUITY.

A Selection of Leading Cases in Equity. With Notes. By Frederick Thomas White and Owen Davies Tudor, Barristers-at-Law. Sixth Edition. W. Maxwell & Son.

There are few law books which have passed through so many editions as this and have retained the characteristics which originally gained them popularity. The additions rendered necessary by recent legislation and decisions are, in general, as tersely and accurately expressed as the original notes; and they are so carefully woven into the text that the book reads much more like a first edition than a sixth. If, however, the work, as it stands, is compared with the original edition, it will be seen how extensive have been the additions in successive editions and how great has been the advance towards completeness. Take, for instance, the notes to *Hulme* v. *Tenant;* in the first edition they occupied about twelve pages, and were divided into two or three heads. In the present edition the notes occupy no fewer than eighty pages, are divided into thirteen heads, and constitute an excellent treatise on separate estate.

It would be difficult to speak too highly of the care with which, within certain limits, the recent authorities have been collected, their effect briefly described and the bones picked out of the judgments. We may, perhaps, however, be allowed to suggest that all the cases of service to the student and practitioner are not to be found in the *Law Reports*, and, as is almost unavoidable in a work of this size, we have observed here and there an omission even in citation from the *Law Reports*. Thus, at p. 979 of vol. 2, where it is stated that an executor ought not, without express authority, to carry on the trade of the testator, except for the purpose of winding up the concern—a reference should be given to *Re Chancellor, Chancellor* v. *Brown* (L. R. 26 Ch. D. 42, noticed on another point at p. 347). In that case it was held by the Court of Appeal that where a testator, who is, at the time of his death, carrying on a business, devises and bequeaths all his real and personal estate to trustees upon the ordinary trust for sale and conversion, and empowers the trustees to postpone the sale and conversion, the trustees have an implied power to carry on the testator's business for a reasonable time for the purpose of sale as a going concern. *Lean* v. *Lean* (23 W. R. 484) might also be usefully cited in this connection. The important decision of the House of Lords in *Robinson* v. *Murdoch* (30 W. R. 162, L. R. 6 App. Cas. 855), with reference to the retention by trustees of the stock of an unlimited bank, should be referred to at p. 982 of the same volume. And it might have been well to point out that the harsh decision in *Sculthorpe* v. *Tipper* (L. R. 13 Eq. 232) was explained by Lord Justice Baggallay in *Re Norrington* as turning on the direction by the testator that his property should be sold "*immediately after his death*, or as soon thereafter as the trustees might think fit." There is an accidental dislocation of a sentence at p. 545 of vol. 1, caused by the insertion of a statement of the effect of *Re Whittaker* (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 657), and two of the references to the Weekly Reporter, at p. 551 of the same volume, require correction. These are, however, only specimens of comparatively trifling oversights; the volumes, in general, are exceptionally well edited.

CORRESPONDENCE.

BALLOT BOXES.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.*]

Sir,—I should be much obliged if you would kindly help me in solving the question, To whom do the ballot-boxes, after a Parliamentary election, belong? It seems there are three classes of persons who lay claim to them—

1. The candidates;
2. The sheriff;
3. The under-sheriff;

The candidates, because they have been charged with them;
The sheriff, because he paid for them;
The under-sheriff, by custom, as his perquisite.

June 2. SAGITTARIUS.

[There seems to be no great doubt as to the ownership, but we will make inquiries as to the alleged custom.—Ed. *S.J.*]

CASES OF THE WEEK.

COURT OF APPEAL.

LOUGHBOROUGH HIGHWAY BOARD *v.* CURZON—C. A. No. 1, 28th May.

Highway—Summary Proceedings for Non-repair—Admission by Waywarden.

In this case the question arose whether the *bonâ fide* admission of a waywarden of a parish, that a certain road is a highway which the parish is bound to repair, is binding on a highway board against which proceedings have been taken before justices, under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 61, for the non-repair of such road. Huddleston, B., and Wills, J., had held (34 W. R. 349) that such admission was binding on the highway board, and that they were not entitled, after such an admission, to deny the fact and so to oust the jurisdiction of the justices. The Court of Appeal (Lord Herschell, C., Lord Esher, M.R., and Fry, L.J.) now affirmed that decision. Lord Herschell, C., said that, although it might be a matter for the Legislature to consider whether it might not be advisable to make it impossible for a waywarden to admit the liability of his parish to repair, the 18th section of the Act of 1862 had not been repealed in terms or by implication. Lord Esher, M.R., concurred, and pointed out that, by such admission by the waywarden, the parish which he represented was rendered liable to contribute, and that, under such circumstances, it was not probable that the waywarden, who was a person elected to perform a public duty, and who could get no benefit out of the matter, would fail to perform his duty. Fry, L.J., concurred.—Counsel, *Jelf*, Q.C., and *Sills; Shiress Will*, Q.C. Solicitors, *Field, Roscoe, & Co.*, for *Deane & Hands*, Loughborough; *Crowders & Vizard*, for *Dickinson & Simpson*, Leicester.

WESTERN SUBURBAN AND NOTTING HILL PERMANENT BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY *v.* MARTIN—C. A. No. 1, 26th and 27th May.

Building Society — Dispute — Reference to Arbitration — Building Societies Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 41), s. 2.

The defendant, who was a shareholding member of the plaintiff society, on the 15th of February, 1881, executed a mortgage to them to secure the sum of £1,125 advanced by them to him. The mortgage-deed contained a covenant for the repayment by the defendant of this sum in monthly instalments. On January 27, 1886, the plaintiff society issued a writ against the defendant to recover the sum of £34 12s., which they alleged to be due to them from him for instalments in arrear under the covenant.

The defendant denied his liability, alleged that the instalments had already been paid, and took out a summons to stay the action and to refer the matter to arbitration. The master made the order, and his decision was upheld by A. L. Smith, J., at chambers, and by the Divisional Court (Grove and Stephen, JJ.) on their construction of section 2 of 47 & 48 Vict. c. 41. The Court (Lord Herschell, C., Lord Esher, M.R., and Fry, L.J.), in allowing the appeal, and reversing the decision of the Divisional Court, said that they would not pretend to construe the whole of the section, but would give the ordinary and grammatical meaning to the third clause of the section, although that might make the rest of the section redundant or ambiguous. So construed the clause read, "The word disputes in the Building Societies Acts or in the rules of any society thereunder . . . shall not prevent any society . . . from obtaining, in the ordinary course of law, any remedy in respect of any mortgage-deed, or any contract contained in any document other than the rules of the society, to which the society would otherwise be by law entitled." On that construction it was plain that the present dispute fell within the clause, and, therefore, the action ought not to be stayed.—Counsel, *Muir Mackenzie*; *Philbrick*, Q.C., and *Tindal Atkinson*. Solicitors, *Reuben C. Green*; *F. P. Sutthery*.

Re HARGREAVES AND THOMPSON—C. A. No. 2, 28th May.

Summons under Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874—Jurisdiction—Interest on Deposit—Costs of Investigating Title.

The question in this case was whether, on a summons under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, the court had jurisdiction, on deciding that a vendor had not shewn a good title to real estate which he had contracted to sell, and that the purchaser was entitled to rescind his contract, to order the vendor to pay interest on the deposit and the purchaser's costs thrown away of investigating the title. In the present case Pearson, J., held that the vendor had shewn a good title to the property, and the Court of Appeal (Cotton, Lindley, and Lopes, L.JJ.) reversed his decision, and ordered the vendor to repay the deposit. They also held that there was jurisdiction to order the vendor to pay interest on the deposit and the purchaser's costs of investigating the title, and made an order to that effect. [It will be remembered that in *Re Higgins and Hitchman's Contract* (L. R. 21 Ch. D. 95), Hall, V.C., held, with some hesitation, that this jurisdiction existed, and that in *Re Yielding and Westbrook* (34 W. R. 397, L. R. 31 Ch. D. 344, *ante*, p. 200), Pearson, J., followed that decision.]—Counsel, *Cozens-Hardy*, Q.C., and *Darley*; *Everitt*, Q.C., and *Oswald*. Solicitors, *Fluz & Leadbitter*; *Johnston, Harrison, & Powell*.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

Re BARBER, BURGESS *v.* VINNICOMBE—Chitty, J., 1st June.

Practice—Security for Costs—Summons to Review Taxation—Taxed Costs Payable to Solicitors.

In this case a motion was made by the plaintiff for an order to stay payment out of court of a sum of £113, by the taxing master's certificate found payable to the defendant's solicitors for taxed costs, until a summons taken out by the defendant to review taxation should be disposed of, or to stay payment of such a portion of the sum as would be sufficient to meet the plaintiff's costs of the summons. It appeared that the action was one by creditors for administration, and that the defendant was a lady of slender means, and that she was under no further liability to her solicitors for costs beyond the £113. The defendant objected to the taxing master's disallowances. Chitty, J., said that he was asked, in the interests of justice, to make a precedent by granting the order. Although there was ground for asking that the defendant should give security, yet he did not think that, on that account, he would be justified in preventing her solicitors from receiving the sums payable to them. The result of so doing would be equivalent to an order on them to pay into court, for they were entitled to take the sum out of court. He was not disposed to extend the practice as to requiring security for costs to cases like that before him. The motion was, therefore, dismissed, with costs.—Counsel, *Farwell*; *F. H. Colt*. Solicitors, *Pritchard, Englefield, & Co.*; *Aldridge, Thorn, & Morris*, for *Harmer & Ruddock*, Great Yarmouth.

SCHOVE *v.* SCHMINCKE—Chitty, J., 1st June.

Copyright Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 42), s. 1—Photograph Album—Book.

This was a motion by a manufacturer of photographic albums for an *interim* injunction restraining the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's registered copyright in an album, called "The Castle Album," and from selling as the plaintiff's goods Castle Albums not of the plaintiff's manufacture. It appeared that the plaintiff claimed to be the inventor of albums called, or known in the trade as, "Castle" Albums, or "The Castle" Albums. The plaintiff's albums were in the usual form of albums, but contained, inside, the title "The Castle Album" and a printed list of the various castles, painted illustrations of which appeared on the pages of the album. The albums complained of by the plaintiff as being sold by the defendant were of similar appearance to those of the plaintiff's manufacture, and contained a similar printed title, with a list of the castles, but the painted illustrations were not copied from the plaintiff's album. Chitty, J., said that the plaintiff's album was a book in form only. It was not a book within the preamble of the Copyright Act, 1842, which spoke of literary work, nor was it within the interpretation of a book contained in the 1st section of the Act. In substance the plaintiff's album was an ornamental article of commerce, consisting of a collection of open spaces for the insertion of photographic portraits within pictures of castles, bound up together in the form of a book. Even if the album were a book, there was no infringement of the copyright. All that the defendant had taken was the title "Castle Album," and it was clear that the mere taking of a title, consisting simply of two ordinary English words, would not be an infringement of copyright. His decision on this point was final. He was also of opinion, on the evidence for the purposes of the motion, that the plaintiff had not shewn that the term "Castle Album" had come to be used in the market in a secondary sense to denote exclusively an album of the plaintiff's manufacture or device, so as to fall within the principle of *Currie* v. *Wotherspoon* (L. R. 5 H. L. C. 508) (*Glenfield Starch case*). He, therefore, refused the motion; costs to be costs in the action.—Counsel, *Romer*, Q.C., and *J. Cutler*; *Aston*, Q.C., and *D. L. Alexander*. Solicitors, *McKenna & Co.*; *H. Bentwitch*.

PAYNE *v.* TANNER—North, J., 31st May.

Executor—Legacy—Admission of Assets—Payment of Interest to Tenant for Life.

The question in this case was whether an executor had, during his lifetime, made a sufficient admission of the existence of residue of his testator's estate so as to bind his own estate, after his death, to pay a corresponding sum to the residuary legatees in remainder of the original testator. A testator, who died in 1841, by his will, gave his real and leasehold hereditaments to J., his executor, on trust for sale, and out of the proceeds of sale to pay the testator's debts and funeral and testamentary expenses and a legacy of £250 to his wife, and to invest the residue on Government or real security, and to pay the income thereof, during the life of the testator's wife, to her and one of his daughters in manner therein mentioned, and after the death of the wife, in trust (in the events which happened) to pay the income to his daughter F. for her life, and after her death to divide the principal equally among the children of the testator's daughter S. (the wife of P.). And the testator bequeathed all his personal estate to his wife absolutely. S. died in 1848, leaving six children. The widow died in 1854. J. died in 1874. F. died in 1883. From the death of the widow until his own death J. paid to F. £28 a year, by quarterly payments of £7, and after the death of J. these payments were continued by the defendant, who was J.'s executor, until the death of F. After her death the children of S., of whom the plaintiff was one, claimed from the defendant an account of the residue of the proceeds of the sale of the real and leasehold estates of the original testator. The defendant then suggested that the payments which had been made to F. during her life had been made to her by way of bounty, and not under any legal liability, and that there had been no residue of the proceeds of sale. This action was brought by one of the children of S. against the executor of J., claiming a declaration that J.'s estate was liable to pay to the residuary legatees under the will of the original testator the amount of the residue of the proceeds of sale of his real and leasehold estates. The plaintiff produced a letter which was in the possession of F. at the time of her death, and which had been written to her by J. in January, 1863, in which J. said:—"In answer to your letter in reference to the trust moneys in which you have a life interest, and the family of the late Mr. P. the ultimate benefit, I beg to say that the money is placed out on different mortgage securities, with moneys of my own, realizing as much interest as possible. Had it not been for your sake, the money should have been placed in the Government stocks years ago. If you are not satisfied with this, I can only say that the money shall be invested in the funds, but you will, of course, understand that your income will be much lessened thereby." Some correspondence was also produced which took place between F. and the defendant after the death of J., in which the defendant, in reply to a claim made by F. for the payment of the £7 a quarter, had asked her to furnish him with an explanation of the circumstances under which the payment had been made to her by J., and had afterwards expressed himself as satisfied with the explanation which she gave. After that explanation the defendant continued to make the quarterly payments to F. The defendant produced a copy of the residuary account of the estate of the original testator, which appeared to have been passed by J. in the year 1868. This account stated that the real and leasehold estates of the testator were sold in the year 1856, and that they realized £3,080, and that the debts and funeral and testamentary expenses of the testator, together with the legacy of £250 to his widow, which had been paid, amounted to £3,343. No personal estate was mentioned in the account. On the footing of this account it appeared that the officer of the Inland Revenue had assessed the duty on the residue of the proceeds of sale at *nil*. North, J., held that the letter of January, 1863, amounted to a sufficient admission by J. that he had then a fund in hand arising from the proceeds of sale which was available to produce an income for F. during her life and to satisfy the persons who were entitled after her death, and that that fund had been set apart by him for the purpose of making those payments. The payment of £7 a quarter was made regularly to F. down to the time of her death, and after J.'s own admission there was quite sufficient to bind him and his estate, unless what he had done could be explained in some way, as by shewing that he had made a mistake and that no assets of the testator in fact existed. A clear explanation was required, and his lordship could find none. None of the letters contained any suggestion that the payments were made by way of gratuity, and, if J. was making a voluntary payment to P., there was no reason why he should speak of persons entitled in remainder after her. The residuary account was not sufficient to outweigh the admission, especially as it was not passed till twenty-seven years after the testator's death, and after it

had been passed the payments to F. were continued by J. as before. His lordship thought that, in the absence of explanation, there was a sufficient admission to bind J.'s estate. And his lordship held that the defendant (who admitted assets of his own testator) was liable to pay £560, the amount which, if invested on mortgage at 5 per cent. interest, would have produced £28 a year, with interest thereon at 4 per cent from the death of F.—COUNSEL, *Cookson*, Q.C., and *Eustace Smith*; *Marcy*. SOLICITORS, *Palmer & Bull*; *Ernest Bevir*.

Re TILLETT, FIELD *v.* LYDALL—North, J., 27th May.

JURISDICTION—CREDITOR'S ADMINISTRATION ACTION—PURCHASE OF DEBTS BY PLAINTIFF'S SOLICITOR—TRUST OF PROFIT FOR CREDITORS—JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 24, SUB-SECTION 7.

A question arose in this case as to the jurisdiction of the court in an administration action to decide a collateral question. The action was brought by a creditor to administer the estate of a deceased person. The assets were insufficient. The plaintiff's solicitor purchased the debts of some of the creditors. The chief clerk's certificate found that the solicitor was a trustee for the creditors of any profit which he might make by the purchase, and that he was not entitled to receive in the administration dividends in respect of the debts which he had purchased exceeding in amount the purchase-money which he had paid, with interest thereon. The solicitor took out a summons to vary the certificate in so far as it limited his right to receive dividends *pari passu* with the other creditors. NORTH, J., held that sub-section 7 of section 24 of the Judicature Act, 1873, did not give the court any jurisdiction to decide in this action whether the solicitor was a trustee for the creditors of any profit which he might make by his purchases. The application to vary the certificate was accordingly granted.—COUNSEL, *Cozens-Hardy*, Q.C., and *Chadwyck Healey*; *Napier Higgins*, Q.C., and *Freeman*; *Micklem*. SOLICITORS, *Flux & Leadbitter*; *J. H. Lydall*.

Re WOODGATE—North, J., 27th May.]

WILL—CHARITY.

The question in this case was whether a gift by will was a good gift to charitable objects. A testatrix, by her will, gave all her residuary real and personal estate to her trustees and executors, upon trust for sale and conversion, and to pay the proceeds to her son, and, in the event of his death in her lifetime, then she gave, devised, and bequeathed the same to H., one of her executors, upon trust, in his discretion, to divide the same among the many sick poor with whom he came in contact, or for any other utilitarian purposes that he might approve or choose, and, in the event of any portion of her estates being inapplicable for this purpose by virtue of the Statute of Mortmain, she gave, bequeathed, and devised the same unto H. The son of the testatrix died in her lifetime, and the question was whether the gift to H., as trustee, could be supported as a charitable gift. NORTH, J., held that the gift was not confined to charitable objects, and it failed for uncertainty.—COUNSEL, *A. Beddall*; *B. Eyre*; *R. F. Norton*. SOLICITORS, *A. Myers*; *Saxton & Morgan*; *W. Butcher*.

HUGHES *v.* LITTLE—Q. B. D., 1st and 2nd June.

BILL OF SALE—FORM—CONSIDERATION—SECURITY AGAINST INDEMNITY GIVEN BY GRANTEE.

In this case the grantor of a bill of sale had assigned certain chattels as security against any moneys which the grantee might be called upon to pay under an indemnity given by her, and also as a security for certain sums advanced by her. The consideration was expressed as follows:—"In consideration of the said H. (the grantee) having at the request of the said C. (the grantor) become guarantee, and having signed a promissory note for the sum of £45 obtained by the said C. from one W. B., of which £32 or thereabouts is now owing." It was contended that this bill of sale was bad, because the consideration was not sufficiently stated in respect of the amount of interest due under the promissory note, and the amount of principal still unpaid. It was further contended that the form in the schedule had not been followed, the assignment being by way of security for the payment of (certain advances) "and for any moneys she may be called upon to pay in respect of the said guaranty, and interest thereon, and on any payments which may be made as aforesaid, at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum." The court held that the bill of sale was good. MANISTY, J., said that the Legislature had two objects in view in passing the Bills of Sale Acts: one was to protect creditors, and the other to protect weak and ignorant persons. The primary object of the Act of 1882 was to compel bills of sale given to secure advances by way of loan to be in a certain clear form. This bill of sale was practically two, one part in respect of a guaranty, and the other in respect of loans. The consideration was truly stated. The instrument was undoubtedly not in the form given in the schedule to the Act, but a bill of sale given as security against loss under an indemnity could not be reduced to that form as regards the precise times and amounts of the payments secured under it. The form was only intended to be followed in assignments of chattels to secure loans. The cases where bills of sale had been held to be void, because not in accordance with the form, had been made in respect of such advances. Section 9 of the Act of 1882 was very different in its language from the preceding section, and that favoured this view of the intention of the Legislature. The time when payments under this bill of sale would become due did not depend upon the mere volition of the creditor, but on a contingency which grantor and grantee alike were uncertain of. MATHEW, J., concurred.—COUNSEL, *Clay*; *Sills*. SOLICITORS, *Grundy*, *Izod*, & *Grundy*, for *Toy & Broadbent*, Ashton-under-Lyne; *Dodd & Longstaffe*, for *Heywood & Sons*, Manchester.

WILLIAMS *v.* DE BOINVILLE, Q. B. D., 1st June.

PRACTICE—NOTICE OF MOTION FOR DAY ON WHICH COURT DID NOT SIT.

In this case a preliminary objection was taken to the hearing of a motion, on the ground that notice of motion had been given for April 28th, "or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard," that being the Wednesday in Easter week, a day on which the courts did not sit; and reliance was placed upon a case of *Maullin* v. *Rogers*, reported in W. N., 1886, p. 104, and *Daubeny* v. *Shuttleworth*, 24 W. R. 321. MANISTY, J., said that in the former case he and Lord Coleridge, C.J., had been of opinion that the notice was bad, and that the matter being of small consequence, it would be better for the parties if it was not proceeded with. In this case, though the notice was bad, the amount in dispute was large, and he would sanction an amendment. MATHEW, J., concurred, and intimated his disapproval of the case of *Daubeny* v. *Shuttleworth*.—COUNSEL, *Upjohn*; *S. Eady* and *Asquith*. SOLICITORS, *Boorman*; *Bramall & White*.

MONAGHAN *v.* TAYLOR—Q. B. D., 31st May.

COPYRIGHT—MUSICAL COMPOSITION—CAUSING OR PERMITTING PERFORMANCE.

This was a motion for a new trial of an action brought under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 20, by which the provisions of the Dramatic Copyright Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 15, are extended to musical compositions. The plaintiff was the assignee of the copyright of a certain song, and the defendant was the proprietor of a music-hall. It appeared at the trial that the defendant engaged a man to sing in his hall, and that he sang the song in question on sixteen occasions. The defendant in his evidence denied that he directed the man to sing the particular song, but would not swear that he had not heard part of the song sung; and he said, "I engaged him and paid him so much a night, and he sang what songs he liked." The trial took place before A. L. Smith, J., and a jury; and the plaintiff obtained a verdict for £32—*i.e.*, sixteen separate penalties of forty shillings. It was contended that there was no evidence that the defendant caused or permitted the performance complained of, and that the singer ought only to be taken to have been the defendant's agent to sing such songs as he might lawfully sing. The court (Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and BOWEN, L.J.) gave judgment for the plaintiff. They said that no distinction was to be drawn between "causing" and "permitting," and that the question was merely one of agency or authority. The cases of *Russell* v. *Briant* (8 C. B. 836), *Lyon* v. *Knowles* (3 B. & S. 556), and *Marsh* v. *Conquest* (17 C. B. N. S. 418), showed that it was possible for a man to infringe a copyright by his agent, and it was a question for the jury whether the defendant had not done so. It was always necessary to have regard to the subject matter to which the law of agency was to be applied. Copyright was a special kind of property protected by special statutory provisions, and it was clear that these provisions would be nugatory unless such persons as proprietors of music-halls were liable for the acts of their agents. The only question was, had any agency been created, had any authority been given? There was evidence that there had been, and the verdict ought not to be disturbed.—COUNSEL, *Fillan*; *C. A. Russell*. SOLICITORS, *Grayston*; *Chester*.

Re HENRY THOMAS BARBER—Prob. Div., 1st June.

PROBATE—PRACTICE—PRESUMPTION OF DEATH—INSURANCE ON LIFE OF DECEASED—NOTICE TO INSURANCE COMPANY.

In this case a point of practice was raised as to the persons to whom notice should be given, where, as here, a motion was made for leave to presume the death of the testator on a certain day, he not having been heard of after that day. In the course of the case it appeared that his life had been insured, and that the insurance company had received no notice of this application. BUTT, J., said that he found the practice as to notice had not been uniform. Although in many cases it was given, he thought it should be given in all cases in future, not necessarily for their protection, but because the court should have before it all possible information, and from the company's interest in asserting that the testator is alive, they are likely to add to that information. The motion would, however, in the present case, be allowed, subject to notice being given to the insurance company, and time being given them to apply to the court if they thought fit.—COUNSEL, *Searle*. SOLICITOR, *Charles H. Robertson*.

BANKRUPTCY CASES.

Ex parte THE REGISTRAR OF THE CROYDON COUNTY COURT, *Re* WISE—C. A. No. 1, 28th May.

BANKRUPTCY—JURISDICTION OF DIVISIONAL COURT OVER OFFICER OF COUNTY COURT.

A question arose in this case as to the jurisdiction of a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division, sitting in bankruptcy, over the registrar of a county court. In a bankruptcy which was proceeding in the county court an order was made setting aside a post-nuptial settlement which the bankrupt had executed, as void against the trustee in the bankruptcy under the Statute of Elizabeth. The estate was being administered in a summary way under section 121 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and, therefore, under sub-section (5) of rule 199 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1883, there could be no appeal without the leave of the court. Leave was given to the trustee of the settlement to appeal to the Divisional Court, on the

terms of his paying £450 into court. The £450 was paid into court, and was then under the control of the registrar of the county court. The appeal was heard by the Divisional Court on the 1st of March, and they held that the settlement was valid, and discharged the order of the county court setting it aside, and, at the same time, ordered that the £450 should be paid out of court to the trustee of the settlement. They gave leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but refused to order a stay of proceedings pending the appeal. Application was then made to the registrar of the county court to pay out the £450, but he declined to do so till after the expiration of the twenty-one days allowed for appealing. He said that it had always been the practice in that county court not to pay out money which had been paid into court in pursuance of an order pending an appeal, or during the period allowed for appealing. Notice of appeal was given, and the appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal on the 16th of April, and was dismissed. Application was again made to the registrar to pay out the money, and he was informed of the dismissal of the appeal, but he refused to pay it out until he had seen the order of the Court of Appeal. On the 19th of April the registrar was served by the trustee of the settlement with notice of a motion in the Divisional Court, calling upon him to show cause why the £450 should not be forthwith paid out to the applicant. The motion was heard on the 21st of April. No objection was raised to the jurisdiction of the court, and the Court (Cave and Grantham, JJ.) made an order in accordance with the motion, and ordered the registrar to pay the trustee's costs of the motion, and his costs occasioned by the refusal of the registrar to pay out the money. The registrar appealed to the Court of Appeal, and on the hearing of the appeal the objection was taken that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order against the registrar, who was an officer of the county court. The court (Lord HERSCHELL, C., Lord ESHER, M.R., and FRY, L.J.) were of opinion that the registrar ought to have paid out the money, but they allowed the objection to the jurisdiction, and discharged the order of the Divisional Court, giving no costs in either court. Lord ESHER, M.R., said that the order of the Divisional Court was the order which the registrar's own court ought to have made, and he ought to have obeyed the order at once. If he had considered the matter, he would have seen that in no court could an appeal of itself operate as a stay of the proceedings under the order appealed from. He was entirely in the wrong, and the practice of his court had been wrong. But still the order of the Divisional Court was a direction to the court from which the appeal had come, and, if the officer of the latter court acted wrongly, was it possible for the Court of Appeal to enforce its own order by committing the officer of the other court for contempt? After the Court of Appeal had pronounced its order, it had nothing more to do with the matter. The order had to be carried out by the other court. The Court of Appeal had no power, upon an original motion, to enforce its order. His lordship doubted whether it could even enforce the payment of the costs of the appeal. When the officer of the county court ventured to disobey an order which he ought to have treated as the order of his own court, the proper course would have been to apply to the county court to enforce obedience. The application was made to a court which had no jurisdiction in the matter, and the order must be discharged. FRY, L.J., entirely concurred. He thought that the conduct of the registrar was highly worthy of blame. It had been contended that the Divisional Court had power to enforce their order by process of contempt. But that order was not an order upon the registrar. The order directed that the money should be paid out to the trustee of the settlement. If the trustee was minded to enforce the order by proceedings for contempt, he ought, at any rate, to have obtained a further order, specifying the person by whom the payment was to be made, and the time within which he was to make it. If such an order could have been obtained it was not, and the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to make the order appealed from.—COUNSEL, *Muir Mackenzie* and *Herbert Reed*; *H. D. Greene*, Q.C., and *F. Cooper Willis*. SOLICITORS, *J. E. Fox*; *Clarkson, Greenwell, & Wyles*.

In the House of Commons on the 27th ult., in answer to Mr. J. More, Mr. Stansfeld said:—The Government have now under consideration a measure with reference to the law as to registration of voters which they hope shortly to introduce. But I have no expectation that it will be possible to pass such a measure in time to affect the arrangements for the registration of voters for the present year.

In giving judgment on Monday, dismissing a petition for the winding up of a company, Vice-Chancellor Bacon remarked that, "In the course of a long examination and cross-examination elsewhere the petitioner was asked "who was to pay the costs of the petition," to which he replied, "I suppose I shall." "That answer," said his lordship, "was prophetic"; and he would adopt the petitioner's prophecy and order him to pay all the costs of the petition.

The Washington Law Reporter says that the following Bill has been introduced in the Ohio legislature:—"Whereas, a habit has grown up among the employés of the various railways in the State of announcing the stations along their lines in a sing-song and inarticulate manner, wholly unintelligible to the travelling public and to the great inconvenience and annoyance of all persons who are compelled to use the said railway lines; therefore, be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of Ohio, that all railway lines in this State shall retain in their service only such employés as are able and are in the habit of speaking clearly and distinctly the English language."

THE CHANCERY CHAMBERS COMMITTEE.

THE following is the report of the committee appointed by the Lord Chancellor to inquire into the subject of the existing rules as to the distribution of business in the courts and chambers of the Chancery Division, and the distribution of the clerical staff:—

MY LORD, August 7, 1885.

In compliance with the Lord Chancellor's request we have with great minuteness considered the procedure of the Chancery Division in court and in chambers, and have agreed upon certain recommendations to lay before your lordship. The conclusions to which we have come are based partly upon evidence produced before us and more on the knowledge of facts possessed by many of the committee.

The Chancery Division is in theory and law one single and undivided court, in which all actions and matters are entered to be determined in the order of their entry; but in practice we find that the division is substantially divided into several courts, each having its separate judge, and in a great measure its separate staff of officials. With the object of distributing the causes and matters equally among the judges, each cause, after being entered in the division in its order, is by a ballot assigned to a particular judge, and is thenceforward (subject to transfer by order of the Lord Chancellor) heard, determined, and carried out in every stage of it, in what is in effect the court of that particular judge, by him and his particular staff of clerks. The division substantially into separate courts is further assured by an agreement amongst the Queen's Counsel practising in the Chancery Division that each of them will act solely before a particular judge.

At some stages of a cause it leaves the hands of the particular officers of the judge to whom it is assigned and passes into the hands of other officials, as, for instance, the registrars for the purpose of drawing up the decree or order, and the taxing masters for purposes of taxation.

Before decree the different steps in a cause are taken before chief and other clerks of the particular judge to whom it has been by ballot assigned, and before the judge himself in chambers; after decree the steps for carrying out such decree are in like manner before the clerks of the same judge and the judge himself in chambers.

The summonses in chambers in causes are distributed alphabetically among the three chief clerks of the judge to whom the cause is assigned, and the subordinates of each of them. The summonses before chief clerks are heard at appointed times. Such appointments are made on the request of solicitors, and are known as short and long appointments. The long appointments are made for a named day and hour and for a limited time, as for one hour or two hours. If the matter is not finished within the appointed time it is postponed to a new appointment, which can only be obtained for a day after all existing appointments are exhausted. The new appointment is, therefore, generally some weeks forward.

All matters taken before the judge personally, other than the principal hearing of a cause, and some hearings adjourned into court, are heard by the judge in his private room, mostly after the rising of his court, and after, therefore, he has sat in court for the whole day. Many orders made by chief clerks are sent to the registrars' office to be drawn up.

We have come to the conclusion that the various and minute distribution of business among the judges, made with the sole object of insuring equality of distribution, has failed in that object, and that it has produced inconvenience and mischief. It has produced, instead of an equality of distribution, an inequality of speed, so that whilst in some courts by the mere accident of circumstances causes remain stationary, in others they are rapidly disposed of, and thus the priority of entry is nullified. This difference of speed obliges transfer, and a transfer in the course of a cause, without the consent of the parties, and after arrangements have been made for the hearing, produces something like injustice. It has produced a difference of practice in the different courts and chambers; in one set of chambers matters are decided by a chief clerk, which in others are decided by the judge; in one counsel are heard in chambers, in another not; in one court each witness cause is heard to its end without postponement, in another not. The practitioner, instead of being able to conduct his business according to one uniform method, must endeavour to learn the different mode of treatment in each court and set of chambers. The difficulty of so doing leads to mistake, and mistake causes delay and expense.

Our first recommendation, therefore, as to the practice of the judges is, that a different mode of distribution of causes and matters should be adopted, and that the procedure before all the judges should be uniform.

Before pointing attention further to this matter we must lay before your lordship the state of business as to progress in the Chancery Division. There were standing for decision in the Chancery Division on the 16th October, 1884, the following number of contentious causes and matters:

Before—(1.) V.C. Bacon.—Actions with and without witnesses	.	146	
Adjourned summonses	.	2	
Further considerations	.	6	
		—	154
(2,) Mr. Justice Kay.—			
Witness actions	.	100	
Non-witness actions	.	17	
Adjourned summonses	.	13	
Further considerations	.	15	
		—	145

(3.) Mr. Justice Chitty.—		
Witness actions	70	
Non-witness actions, including summonses	112	
Further considerations and procedure summons	18	
		200
(4.) Mr. Justice North.—		
Witness actions		127
(5.) Mr. Justice Pearson.—		
Witness actions	73	
Non-witness actions and summonses, Classes II. and III.	70	
Adjourned summonses, Class IV.	54	
Further considerations	19	
		216
Total number of causes in the Chancery list		842

There were standing for decision on the 23rd May, 1885—

(1.) V.C. Bacon.—Actions with and without witnesses	105	
Adjourned summonses	19	
Further considerations	2	
		126
(2.) Mr. Justice Kay.—		
Witness actions	92	
Non-witness actions	11	
Adjourned summonses	25	
Further considerations	13	
		141
(3.) Mr. Justice Chitty.—		
Witness actions	80	
Non-witness actions, including summonses	75	
Further considerations, point of law and procedure summonses	14	
		169
(4.) Mr. Justice North.—		
Witness actions		82
(5.) Mr. Justice Pearson.—		
Witness actions	46	
Non-witness actions and summonses, Classes II. and III.	76	
Adjourned summonses, Class IV.	14	
Further considerations	13	
		149
Total number of causes in the Chancery list		667

Sixty-five causes were, between October, 1884, and May, 1885, transferred from the Chancery Division to the Queen's Bench Division.

It is clear to all of us that the present number of judges attached to the Chancery Division cannot cope with the business now before them, and could not satisfactorily do so even if what may be called arrears were wiped off. The transfer without their consent of causes entered by litigants, who have selected the Chancery Division as their preferred forum, is not a satisfactory, though at present it is a necessary, interference. We have therefore felt constrained, some of us for a time with reluctance, but now with an earnest conviction, to recommend that an additional judge be appointed to the Chancery Division, and that the same staff of clerks be attributed to each of the judges. We at once point out, however, that it does not necessarily follow that the whole number of clerks need be increased. For instance, four judges have now each three chief clerks, making twelve. But six judges might only have two chief clerks each, which would still leave the number twelve.

We proceed now to the process of distributing the business among the judges. The most simple method would, of course, be no longer to assign causes to a judge, but to set down for each day a certain number of the cases from the general list to be heard according to their order in the list before the judges respectively on each day, as is done in the Queen's Bench Division. But certain considerations have prevented us from suggesting this method. The nature of the litigation, which is proper to the Chancery Division, makes it, we think, advisable that the carrying out of a decree, or of causes involving the continuous management of property, should be continued before the same judge. The unanimous opinion of all the witnesses examined by us, and the opinion of many of the committee, is strongly in favour of this, and also of the advantage to the suitors of the leading counsel attaching themselves to particular courts. The importance of this last is not so apparent to some members of the committee; but they do not think it advisable in the face of opinions of great weight to break this rule. It becomes necessary, therefore, to suggest some method of distribution not inconsistent with these desired conditions.

One of the greatest inconveniences in the mode in which business is at present transacted in the Chancery Division is in relation to the trial of actions with witnesses. According to the present system each judge makes his own arrangements for the disposal of the various classes of business in his court. He has to provide for the hearing of witness actions, non-witness actions, motions, adjourned summonses, and petitions. As regards the three latter classes of business, the necessities of the case demand that they should be disposed of with regularity and promptitude. The consequence is that in some courts witness actions are not tried for several weeks together, and under the most favourable circumstances not more than three days, with perhaps a portion of a fourth day, in the week are given to the trial of these actions. The interruption of the trial of witness actions is one of the greatest evils of the present system, and in the opinion of the committee a reform whereby a witness action once begun may be heard continuously and *de die in diem* is one which is most urgently demanded. It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate the evils attendant on the interruption of the trial of an action with witnesses. If it is a country case witnesses must be either detained in London until the action again appears in the paper, or must be sent down to the country to be brought up again when wanted. The length of time occupied by the case and the consequent expense to the suitors is increased by the temptation for the parties to employ the interval in looking up and producing additional evidence.

It is in order to meet this grave defect and at the same time to preserve so far as possible the advantages which have been pointed out by the witnesses in the present system, that a plan has been suggested by Mr. Davey whereby it is hoped that there may always be three judges engaged in trying witness actions, and the necessity of a judge interrupting the trial of an action to take other business may be avoided. By this plan, which has been adopted by way of preference by the committee, it is proposed to sub-divide the Chancery Division for the purpose of distribution of business into three branches, each consisting of two courts and two judges. In one of the courts the witness actions attached to the branch would be continuously tried so long as necessary, whilst in the other court the non-witness actions and interlocutory business of the branch would be disposed of. The following table shows how the system might be worked, but the details and any necessary variations which circumstances might from time to time require would, of course, be left to be arranged by the judges themselves.

	BRANCH I.		BRANCH II.			BRANCH III.	
	V. C. Bacon.	North, J.	Kay, J.	Pearson, J.	Chitty, J.	New Judge.
Monday	Chambers.	Witness actions.	Non-witness actions.	Witness actions.	Non-witness actions.	Witness actions.
Tuesday	Do.	Do.	Chambers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
Wednesday	Non-witness actions and adjourned summonses.	Do.	Non-witness actions.	Do.	Chambers.	Do.
Thursday		Do.	Motions and adjourned summonses. Chambers.	Do.	Do.	Do.
Friday	Motions, petitions, and adjourned summonses. Chambers.	Do.		Do.	Motions, petitions, and adjourned summonses.	Do.
Saturday		Do.	Petitions and adjourned summonses. Witness actions.	Do.		Non-witness actions.
Monday	Witness actions.			Non-witness actions.	Witness actions.	Do.
Tuesday	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Motions and adjourned summonses.
Wednesday	Do.	Non-witness actions and adjourned summonses.	Do.	Chambers.	Do.	Chambers.
Thursday	Do.		Do.	Motions and adjourned summonses. Petitions and adjourned summonses. Chambers.	Do.	
Friday	Do.	Motions, petitions, and adjourned summonses.	Do.		Do.	Petitions and adjourned summonses.
Saturday	Do.		Do.		Do.	

We particularly draw attention to the fact that the scheme above set forth is merely a nominal sub-division for the purpose of distribution only; the Chancery Division will remain for all other purposes one and indivisible. As, for instance, any of the judges can at any time sit to hear the causes or matters which are assigned to any one of the branches. The counsel, however, could still attach themselves to one only of the branches.

The mode of working this scheme would commence by a new mode of assigning the causes and matters—namely, by the action of a responsible officer instead of by ballot. Such an officer would have means of learning, and would be instructed to learn, the nature, as to length and otherwise, of causes and matters, and to distribute them accordingly. This, we think, would be an improvement on the hazardous operation of a ballot.

An important part of this scheme consists in appointing one of the judges of the Chancery Division to attend at chambers every day during the whole day, the judges to take this part of the work in turn, instead of each judge sitting in his own room after the working hours of long days in court. A considerable amount of business will thus be taken in a more satisfactory manner, as we think, before the judge personally in chambers.

Summonses in all steps of a cause before the hearing, which are to be heard before a judge personally, should be heard before the judge of the day in chambers, in whatever branch of the division the cause or matter may be depending.

We recommend that the applications mentioned in the 17th resolution should be heard similarly before the judge of the day in chambers. These applications, from their nature, require, in our opinion, the personal consideration of a judge; we suggest that no such applications should be disposed of by a chief clerk. Either party should have a right to be heard in all matters in chambers by counsel, subject to check as to costs.

We recommend that the judges of the division should meet from time to time and arrange the days on which each will sit in chambers, and the days on which, in each branch, certain classes of causes will be taken.

We venture to point out, as a cardinal necessity, that the arrangements should be such as to give, as nearly as possible, consecutive days of hearing in each branch for the hearing of witness causes, and, at the same time, we think that order XXXVII., rule 1, might with advantage be modified in such a manner as to restrict the cases in which the expense and delay of taking evidence *viva voce* at the trial is incurred to those actions in which there is a real and *bonâ fide* dispute of fact depending upon the testimony of witnesses.

Where a cause or matter has proceeded to hearing and to a decree or order, we think that any subsequent order to be made for the purpose of carrying out the decree or order should be made by the clerks of the judge who made the decree or order, or if a personal order of a judge be necessary, by the judge who made the decree or order. This last may be done either on the day on which he sits in chambers or before him, at some appointed time, in his own room.

Another method of distribution has been suggested by Mr. Justice Pearson; it has been adopted by the committee as an alternative scheme so far as court business is concerned. The committee desire to commend it to your lordship's consideration if the former scheme appears to you to be unsatisfactory.

The court scheme and chamber scheme suggested by Mr. Justice Pearson are arranged to fit into one another, and are thus described by him:—

"In the following proposal for the disposal of the business in court, it is assumed that an additional judge will be appointed to the Chancery Division, and the principal matters that have been kept in view are these:

1. That an additional court should be assigned for hearing witness actions, so that such actions should be heard in two courts *de die in diem*, without interruption from interlocutory matters.
2. That the business should be so arranged that counsel may, as they now do, attach themselves to particular courts.
3. That the court business should be divided between the judges, so that each judge should have an equal share of interlocutory business, non-witness and witness actions.
4. That there should be one judge at chambers daily, who would thus have time to hear counsel at chambers, and dispose of many matters there which are now adjourned into court.

I.—Court Business.

There should be five courts: I., II., III., IV., V. Courts I., II., and III. should at first be devoted to hearing interlocutory matters and non-witness actions, Courts IV. and V. to witness actions. All writs when issued should be assigned by rota to Courts I., II., and III., with the understanding that when any witness action was ripe for hearing it would be transferred to Court IV. or V. The assignment would be to the court, and not to any particular judge. All interlocutory work and non-witness actions, therefore, would be confined to three courts and witness actions to two courts.

One judge in rotation should attend chambers *de die in diem*, leaving the other judges to sit in the courts. Say that he went there for a month; at the end of the month he would leave chambers and take the place of one of the other judges, who go to chambers. At the end of the next month that judge would leave chambers and take the place of another judge, who would relieve him. In this way the judicial work would be equally divided among all the judges, and no court would be closed for a single day.

The following table shows the proposed scheme of rotation, Mr. Justice Brown being the additional judge in the Chancery Division:—

—	Interlocutory. Non-witness Actions.			Witness Actions.		Chambers.	—
	Court I.	Court II.	Court III	Court IV.	Court V.		
Jan.	Bacon, VC	Kay, J.	Chitty, J.	North, J.	Pearson, J.	Brown, J.	Jan.
Feb.	—	—	—	—	Brown, J.	Pearson, J.	Feb.
March	—	—	—	Pearson, J.	—	North, J.	March
April	—	—	North, J.	—	—	Chitty, J.	April
May	—	Chitty, J.	—	—	—	Kay, J.	May
June	Kay, J.	—	—	—	—	Bacon, V.C.	June
July	—	—	—	—	Bacon, VC	Brown, J.	July

With regard to witness actions at the end of each sitting, the witness actions ready for hearing should be distributed between Courts IV. and V., and lists printed showing the distribution. If the odd numbers were put into one court and the even numbers into the other they would then keep, as far as possible, their respective places. If at the end of a sitting it was found that, by reason of the length of some actions, there had been a block in one of the courts, some slight redistribution might be made to prevent any actions being unduly delayed.

With regard to chamber business, it is proposed that the chambers, instead of being distributed as now between four judges, the chambers of each judge being entirely separate from those of every other judge, should be consolidated, and that the judge at chambers should have power to dispose of every matter brought before him, whether the action in which it originated was tried by him or not. The arrangement of the business would be as follows:—

a. One judge in rotation would, by the proposed scheme, attend at chambers every day. He should have power to dispose of every matter pending there, but with power to order any matter to be brought before any other judge, if for any reason he should consider it desirable that another judge should hear it.

b. On the hearing of any matter in chambers, the chief clerk in whose division the matter is should attend the judge.

c. As under this court scheme no action or matter would be assigned to any judge all new actions and matters should be assigned to the chief clerks alphabetically.

d. The existing wards' cases should be retained by the judge to whom they are at present attached. All new wards' cases should be considered attached to the judge who makes the first order in them, or be divided among the judges alphabetically as the business is now among the chief clerks. In cases involving the continuous management of property, the judge who makes the original decree or order should have power to direct that all applications in chambers relating to the administration of the property be brought before himself personally.

The chamber work would thus be brought under the jurisdiction of the judges generally, instead of being attached as now to individual judges. It is thought by some that this severance of the chief clerks from particular judges would be mischievous, and that judges would find difficulties in following the working out of judgments not pronounced by themselves. It has happened to me to take Mr. Justice Kay's chambers twice during his absence on circuit, and in my present chambers I have to deal with many actions, some of which began in the time of Vice-Chancellor Malins, and some in the time when Mr. Justice Fry presided in my court. No difficulty has ever occurred, that I recollect, from the fact that I was not the judge who tried those actions; and from my experience my strong opinion is that no appreciable advantage is derived to the judge or the suitor from the decree being worked out by the judge who tried the action. With the exception of cases relating to wards, and perhaps a few exceptional cases relating to the administration of large estates for which provision is made in this scheme, it seems to me a matter of indifference by what judge the business in chambers is disposed of. Meanwhile, according to the present system, there is such a minute subdivision of labour in chambers that there is a great waste of time, labour, and expense, and it is impossible to avoid this, or to arrange for the disposal of business as continuously and quickly as should be done, or in the case of the illness of any clerk to provide for his work being taken without calling in costly assistance from outside. Without exceeding the present expenditure on chambers, and probably with a considerable reduction of it, I am satisfied that, by re-arranging the staff, the work would be done as well as now, more easily, and more expeditiously. I desire to add that I wish to speak, as I think, in the highest terms of the present chief clerks; they are very competent, and discharge the duties of their office admirably. I am very far from making any complaint of them. My complaint is that under the present system there are too many generals and too few captains.

The following scheme purports to show only one mode in which the re-arrangement of the consolidated chambers might be made, and the probable expense.

II.—Chambers.

1. There should be four chief clerks, among whom the business would be divided alphabetically, each chief clerk taking six letters, reckoning the 26 letters as equivalent only to 24.

The chief clerks would take appeals from other clerks, originating summonses, wards' cases, and such other business as they thought fit, or the judges assigned to them, and the general supervision of all matters in their division.

Eight clerks, who should be solicitors, and whose salaries should

begin at £800 and rise to £1,000, who should take the shorter matters now taken by the chief clerks. At present the chief clerks devote three hours daily to these matters, so that as there are 12 chief clerks 36 hours are daily devoted to them. The clerks in the proposed system would sit from 11 to 4, and would each devote five hours to them, or 40 hours in all would be given to them. From 10 to 11 o'clock they might assess costs or revise the certificates prepared by the certificate clerks, or do other work assigned to them by the chief clerk.

Four clerks whose salaries should begin at £600 and rise to £800, should take the longer appointments now taken by the chief clerks, and continue them *de die in diem*. For this purpose they would be put into lists and taken as causes are in court, with due regard to the convenience of solicitors. The chief clerks at present give not more than two hours a day to these, or 24 hours. The four clerks would give six hours a day, or 24 hours.

Eight clerks, with salaries beginning at £400 and rising to £600 would draw the certificates.

Eight clerks, with salaries beginning at £400 and rising to £600, would take the liquidators' and companies' orders, and accounts of liquidators and receivers.

Eight clerks, with salaries beginning at £400 and rising to £600, would take summonses for time, and executors' and guardians' accounts.

Four clerks, with salaries beginning at £200 and rising to £400, should give appointments and make lists for superior clerks.

Four clerks, with salaries beginning at £200 and rising to £400, should endorse orders and issue summonses.

Two clerks, with salaries of £200 each, should keep the Treasury Book.

The staff in each division would therefore stand as follows:—

One chief clerk.
Two clerks for shorter summonses and assessing costs.
One clerk to take the longer appointments.
Two clerks to draw the certificates.
Two clerks to take liquidators' and receivers' accounts, &c.
Two clerks to take summonses for time, executors' accounts, &c.
One clerk to give appointments.
One clerk to issue summonses.

The expense in each division, supposing each clerk was earning the highest salary, would be—

Chief clerk	£1,500
Two clerks at £1,000	2,000
One clerk at £800	800
Six clerks at £600	3,600
Two clerks at £400	800
	£8,700

The expense of the four divisions would be £34,800, to which must be added £400, the salaries of the clerks who keep the Treasury Book, making the whole expense about £4,700 less than at present.

The clerks at £1,000 a year should be solicitors of not less than seven years' standing, and those at £800 a year of not less than five years' standing. A clerk taken in in one grade should be capable of rising without this qualification to a higher grade if found fit.

No chief clerk should hold office after seventy years of age, and no other clerk after sixty-five. This should not apply to existing clerks."

That part of Mr. Justice Pearson's scheme, as above stated, which relates to the working of it in chambers, and to the alteration in the number, *status*, and pay of clerks, was not adopted by the committee.

We are of opinion that the suggested alterations of the present method of distributing causes and matters, and the suggested co-operative arrangements to be made from time to time by the judges of the Chancery Division, will conduce very materially to the speed of the work in court and to the satisfactory performance of work before the judges personally in chambers.

With regard to the practice before chief clerks and others in chambers, we are of opinion that the greatest impediment to the satisfactory performance of business there transacted is the system of appointments. We strongly urge upon your lordship the necessity of abolishing this system. We recommend that all summonses to be taken before chief clerks or other clerks, relating to the conduct of causes before the hearing, shall be divided between the chief clerks of the branches to which such causes are assigned by an alphabetical rotation or by some other method to be fixed by the judges of the Chancery Division; and that all summonses after hearing or decree should be divided in a similar manner between the chief clerks of the judge who made the order or decree. We most strongly recommend that each chief clerk should take the summonses assigned to him in their order as entered, and should, unless some obstacle intervene, hear and conclude each summons before entering upon another. This would, of course, not interfere with a power in case of need to adjourn any particular summons to a day to be named at the adjournment. Neither need it interfere with arrangements to take short summonses in the morning or on certain days and long summonses at a later hour or on other days. A list would be published of the summonses to be taken on each day, as the lists of causes and matters to be heard in court on each day are now published.

Summonses as to procedure or otherwise before hearing would in the same circumstances as now and in the same manner be sent, if occasion required, before a judge personally; only it would be before the judge of the day in chambers. Other summonses in like manner would go personally before the judge who made the decree or order or is carrying out the administration, &c., to be heard by him either on the day he will be sitting as the judge of the day in chambers or on an appointed day in his private room. We think that these alterations of the practice in chambers will render the administration in chambers far more satisfactory.

We have come to the conclusion that much time and expense would be saved if those who draw up decrees and orders, as the registrars, and those who tax costs, as the taxing masters, were not so completely divided from the chief clerks and other officials of the division, and if they were brought more under the control and supervision of the judges. We therefore recommend, as in resolution 4 and 5, that by degrees the separate offices of registrars and taxing masters should be abolished, clerks of equal qualifications being assigned to each judge to perform their duties.

At some future time it would probably appear that a new classification and arrangement of clerks should be made, but experience alone, we think, can indicate what changes should be made in this respect.

We have very carefully considered many of the steps now taken in causes and matters, and have recommended in various resolutions the abolition of such as seem to us to be unnecessary, being convinced that every unnecessary step in litigation causes delay, expense, and error.

We submit this report of our labours, and the resolutions accompanying it, to your lordship, with the earnest hope that in what we have done we may have suggested means which may materially improve the practice of the Chancery Division in court and in chambers.

ESHER, M.R.
EDWARD E. KAY.
JOHN PEARSON, subject to my note.
HORACE DAVEY.
FRANK MOWATT, subject to my observations.
J. STIRLING, M. I. JOYCE } subject to our note.
K. M. MACKENZIE.
HENRY ROSCOE.
THOMAS MARSHALL.

H. S. THEOBALD, Secretary.
To the Lord Chancellor.

Mr. Justice Kay desires to say that he has signed the report subject to the following remarks:—

I regret that I am not able to concur in all the recommendations of the report and resolutions, for the following reasons:—

Two of the greatest advantages of the system of the Chancery Division are—

1. The practice of leading counsel attaching themselves to one court.
2. The close association of each staff of chief and other clerks with a particular judge.

Everyone who has given evidence before the commitee has recognized the benefit of the system in these respects.

No. 1 ensures that the suiter should have the services of his leading counsel, the judge has a like security, work is much more largely distributed among leaders, and the disadvantages, if there be any, are ideal and are not felt in practice.

As to No. 2, the old abuses of the masters' offices have been much lessened, the work in chambers is under more control, and with some improvements which have been suggested other evils may be removed, if the supervision of the individual judge over his own chamber staff be not destroyed or lessened.

For the purpose of obtaining a more continuous hearing of witness causes the report contains recommendations which will tend to break up the system of counsel attending the court, and to dissociate the judge from his chamber staff. The alternative proposal of Mr. Justice Pearson would do this absolutely.

Recognizing thoroughly the advantage of more continuous sittings to try witness causes, I think this too large a price to pay for it. The present mode of trying them three days a week seems to me preferable, and with care it need not often happen that a cause should be interrupted and the witnesses sent back.

I, therefore, wish respectfully to intimate my dissent from the report and resolutions in this respect.

Of the two schemes I think the former, suggested by Mr. Davey, much preferable, because it interferes less than the other with the present system. The alternative scheme would do away with the present system of leaders attaching themselves to a particular court and would place chief clerks in almost the same position as our masters in Chancery formerly held.

There is in the conduct of actions in Chancery considerable delay and expense which might and ought to be prevented. Some of the resolutions, I think, are well calculated to meet this evil. But I think much more might be done. At present order 33, rule 9, and order 65, rule 11, are either a dead letter or are used only for purposes of punishment and this so seldom that they have little or no deterrent operation.

I have recommended that means should be adopted to enable every judge to have an easily accessible record of the progress of all actions in his court, that it should be the duty of all chief clerks and other officials to call his attention to any case of improper delay or other impropriety in the conduct of an action, and that some extension of the power of summoning before him parties or their solicitors should be given to enable him to deal with this old and well founded reproach to the system of procedure in Chancery. I regret that some recommendations on this head are not embodied in the report and resolutions.

With many of the suggestions I cordially agree, but feeling very strongly that these matters are of the greatest importance to the interests of suitors in the Chancery Division, I am unable to concur in the report and resolutions without appending this statement of my individual opinion.

E. E. KAY.

I have signed this report, but I desire to add that I dissent from some of the principal recommendations in it.

I. I object to the scheme for court business proposed by Mr. Davey.

I agree with him that provision ought to be made for hearing witness actions continuously, and I am willing to concur with those who think it desirable, if possible, to preserve the present system of counsel attaching themselves to particular courts. I also am strongly of opinion that a judge should attend chambers constantly, and should hear counsel there.

My objections to the scheme preferentially recommended in the report are:—

1. It will not be possible under it to hear witness actions continuously. Each judge of each court is to take witness actions, non-witness actions, interlocutory business, and chamber work. That is to say, chamber work is to be added to the present complication of business in four of the existing courts, and the interruption of the hearing of witness actions must necessarily, therefore, be more certain and more frequent under the proposed scheme than it is under the present system.

2. It is proposed that each judge shall hear witness actions for one week continuously. What is to become of his chamber work during this week? Either it must be done by his colleague in the branch, in which case a judge will not work out his own decree, or it must be left undone. In the latter alternative a great part of the chamber business of each court will be disposed of only once a fortnight.

3. How are motions to be dealt with? There is to be a motion day in each court of the branch in each alternate week. A motion, therefore, that stands over to answer affidavits will have to be postponed for a fortnight, or must be transferred to the other judge of the branch. The inconvenience of either of these alternatives is obvious.

4. It is suggested that counsel may attach themselves to one of the branches, as they now do to a particular court. If this means that counsel may accept briefs in both courts of the branch the scheme would defeat itself, as counsel would frequently find that they were wanted to be in two courts at the same time. If on the other hand it is intended that they should attach themselves to one court of the branch, then each court must be complete in itself, and all interchange of business between the two courts of the branch vanishes. The system will then be practically the same as at present, with the subtraction of the judge from the court from time to time for chamber work.

II. I dissent from the recommendation "that by degrees the separate offices of registrars and taxing masters should be abolished, clerks of equal qualifications being assigned to each judge to perform their duties," and to resolutions 4 and 5 on which this recommendation is based.

1. As to the registrars. At present the registrars circulate in all the courts, including the Court of Appeal. In this way they obtain a wide experience of the practice, and are often able to assist a judge greatly in framing a decree by informing him of what another judge has done under similar circumstances. If under the proposed recommendation a judge is to have two clerks attached to his own court he will be deprived of this assistance, without any compensating benefit. If the clerks who are to take the place of the present registrars are to be clerks in the judges' chambers, and are to be shifted from time to time to do other work, their places being supplied by other clerks from the same chambers, I fear it will soon be found that the successors of the registrars have not the same special knowledge of the forms of the court which the present officers possess, and the judges will be embarrassed for want of the assistance which they now obtain. The present system of appointing the registrars by seniority might, I think, be advantageously altered.

2. As to the taxing masters. It is in my judgment a great advantage that the taxing masters are entirely separated from all matters in respect of which they have to tax bills of costs in their earlier stages. They are thus kept independent and impartial, and no solicitor need fear their being prejudiced by any opinion they have formed in the progress of the litigation.

J. PEARSON.

Mr. Mowatt desires to add the following observations:—

I have signed the foregoing report because I believe that the changes therein recommended will result in economy both of time and cost, but they appear to me to leave untouched some of the main causes of the block now existing in the Chancery Chambers.

The evidence given before the committee was of great value, and showed an intimate knowledge of the subjects on which the several witnesses spoke, but it only professed to represent the views of gentlemen whose success in life had been unaffected by the expense and delay of the present system. It was, in the nature of things, impossible to obtain the views of the suitors—the class to which those evils come home with serious and often ruinous effect.

How great is the suitors' interest in the question may be gathered from the fact that the total costs in chancery amount to at least £2,000,000 a year, or £10,000 for each day on which the courts are open for business.

The defects of the existing arrangements are obvious; the sole conflict of opinion appears to be as to whether they admit of cure.

The main causes of the block of business are:—

1. The large part of the year during which the chambers are closed to the suitors generally.
2. The want of any provision for controlling the conduct of the business; for requiring that the practitioners should be competent for their work; and for preventing the abuse of the forms of procedure for the purpose of wilful obstruction.

I will take these causes in order.

1. The working days of the year are 310, of which the chambers are open about 205, and closed, except for a very small and special class of work, on 105.

Thus for one-third of the year business is at a standstill, and the services of a staff, costing over £100,000 a year in salaries, go to waste.

This does not appear to have been the intention of the Judicature Act of 1873, which provided that all applications requiring prompt or immediate hearing should be dealt with in vacation.

Unfortunately, however, it has not been left to the suitor to decide whether the prompt decision of his case is important, nor, I believe, have any general rules been made on the subject, and, in the result, the amount of business done in vacation is insignificant.

The following case, which came before us in evidence, illustrates the working of the present vacation arrangements.

In a liquidation "involving millions of money," the liquidator applied to Mr. Justice Chitty to allow his chief clerk to give one or two days to settle the list of contributories. The application, however, could not be taken out of its turn, and it accordingly had to stand over, not only till its turn was reached, but till after the Long Vacation, when it was concluded in three days.

Persons acquainted with proceedings in liquidation will probably think that few matters could require more prompt attention than the settlement of the list of contributories to the estate of a bankrupt Joint Stock Company, Limited.

The loss and hardship inseparable from the postponement of such a settlement for four months afford a good example of the cost to the suitor of the present vacation close time.

It would be easy to multiply instances, but the one quoted appears to me enough to show the necessity of such a change as will provide for the chambers being open to all suitors throughout the year, and for the constant attendance of a staff sufficient to deal promptly with the current business.

Against such a change several witnesses argued that the suitor would not, in fact, receive any benefit, as he would be unable to induce either counsel to advise him or solicitors to appear for him in chambers during vacation time.

This objection is not, to my mind, convincing. There is, of course, in chancery, as elsewhere, much work in which despatch is not of importance, but, on the other hand, there are many cases in which delay brings suffering and even ruin to the parties concerned. In such cases it is probable that the considerations which induce all other professions to adapt their arrangements to the demands of their clients will enable the suitor to command the services of counsel and solicitors. Indeed, the witnesses admitted that, even at present, most solicitors have a representative in attendance in London throughout the year, and the services of competent counsel can easily be obtained if required.

A second objection was taken to the proposed change—namely, that the chamber work is performed under such pressure that the staff requires the full amount of vacation afforded by the existing arrangement. The chief clerks are, beyond doubt, very hard-worked officials, as are the heads of many other departments of the public service, whose vacation is just one-half that now enjoyed in the Chancery Chambers. The work of the rest of the staff does not appear to be at all excessive. But any pressure now existing is the natural result of the attempt to pack the work of a year into eight months; it would disappear if the chambers were kept permanently open.

If that were done, and if the more elastic organization recommended in the report were adopted, I am convinced that the existing staff, which consists of 32 principal officers with salaries of £1,500 and of 100 clerks (besides copyists) receiving from £100 to £800 a year, each would be more than sufficient to deal promptly with all business coming before them while retaining the full amount of vacation enjoyed generally throughout the Civil Service.

Of course in any changes affecting the position or duties of the staff the rights of existing officers would be retained to them.

2. The second evil is even more serious.

The delay caused by the incompetence of some of the persons deputed by solicitors to represent them in chambers is such as, in my opinion, to demand some attempt at a remedy.

The solicitor (or clerk) who fails to keep an appointment made before a chief clerk, or who attends without having got up the business to be done, wastes the time not only of the chief clerk but also of all the solicitors (often six or eight) appearing in the case; and each such miscarriage entails a delay of about a month, the time necessary to obtain a fresh appointment.

The result was thus summarized by one of the most experienced of the chief clerks:—

"The power to prevent delay in chambers rests mainly with the solicitors attending.

"The best cure for delay would be to require the persons attending to be better educated. They are now often inferior clerks who thrust the papers into our hands and leave us to do the work.

"Not half the persons who attend chambers are qualified solicitors."

At present the only check on this abuse is the power of a chief clerk to disallow the fee for attendance when nothing has been done to earn it, but this disallowance, though it affects the amount of the costs admitted by the taxing master, does not reduce the sum actually received by the solicitor from his client, nor does it apply to the fees of the solicitors or clerks who attend for the other parties in the case. In practice this check, if check it can be called, has no appreciable effect.

A more effective remedy would be found in a rule similar to that which prevents a case being argued in court by the barrister's clerk, or the practice of medicine by a person not holding a diploma.

This would also appear to have been the intention of the law, which requires a man to serve his time and to pass a prescribed examination before he can be admitted a solicitor, but the requirement becomes of small value if he is allowed to delegate his work to a clerk who has done neither.

It has been objected that such a rule would operate hardly on many clerks now attending chambers who, although they have neither been admitted as solicitors nor passed an examination are, in practice, perfectly competent to conduct the business. There are, no doubt, many such persons, but I cannot see why, if their legal attainments are sufficient for the conduct of business, they should be unable to pass an examination expressly framed to test those attainments. They have probably not passed the examination because, under the existing system, it was not worth their while to do so.

On the other hand, it is notorious that many persons conducting business in chambers under the existing rules are altogether inefficient, and I do not think that an occasional case of individual hardship should be allowed to stand in the way of a necessary reform. If a solicitor has more business than he can perform in person, he should obtain, and charge for, competent assistance, for unless the conduct of proceedings in chambers is in competent hands no possible regulations will ensure despatch.

The wilful obstruction of business for illegitimate purposes is an evil for which a complete remedy is impossible, but I think that something may be done towards checking the abuse.

In dealing with this part of the subject I desire to disclaim any intention of reflecting on the solicitors' profession. Its representatives are, beyond all doubt, a body of honourable men, discharging with conspicuous ability duties of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, for which the existing scale of remuneration is, in my opinion, often inadequate.

On the other hand, a solicitor's work is necessarily performed under conditions which withdraw it from the bracing atmosphere of public scrutiny either in court or by the press; and this freedom from criticism affords opportunities of which certain unscrupulous practitioners are not slow to avail themselves in the illegitimate interests of themselves or of their clients.

It is not only that the costs of necessary proceedings are thus increased; a more serious evil is the power so to obstruct the chamber business as to force a suitor to drop or to compromise claims to which there is no answer in equity. The perusal of the details of a few cases which were incidentally brought to the notice of the committee, and which are printed in the appendix, will show that this is not a fancied evil. It will always be difficult, often impossible, to test the *bond fides* of applications for adjournment on one of the various pleas whereby the chamber proceedings can at present be obstructed almost indefinitely; but unless some means can be devised of mitigating the evil no satisfactory reform of the existing system appears practicable.

I suggest that the remedy is to be sought not in any increase of the extensive power already possessed by the court, but in such arrangements as will prevent that power from falling into disuse.

The Supreme Court Rules, order 33, rule 9, provide that if, in the opinion of the court, there is any undue delay in any proceeding, the court may call for explanation of the delay and may make such order with regard thereto as the circumstances of the case may require.

The court has thus ample power of control, but examples of its exercise are extremely rare, and although the existence of undue delay is hardly denied no attempt appears to have been made to apply systematically the controlling powers of the court.

For this purpose two things are necessary:—

1. That each chief clerk should be instructed to report to the judge any case in which he considers that there is unnecessary delay, expense, or other impropriety in the conduct of the proceedings in his chambers.
2. That, to enable the judge to act on such report, there should be kept in chambers a record of the date of the successive steps in the proceedings in each case, of the progress made at each appointment, and of the cause of each adjournment. A copy of the entry relating to any case should be obtainable by any person on payment of a fixed fee.

With this record before him a judge will know what is the general state of the business in his court or branch, and his attention will be drawn to cases which remain year after year without perceptible progress in his chambers. Moreover, such a record, if made accessible to applicants, as suggested above, would, for the first time, afford the means of bringing to bear public scrutiny and comment on cases of abuse or obstruction, if such exist, and would be of great assistance in deciding what reforms were from time to time required.

Each judge will thus be in a position to put in action, when needful, the ample power of control which he already possesses (in name) under the Judicature Act. So long as the power is used with discretion (and no other use need be feared) it will operate not more in the interest of the public than in that of the very large majority of solicitors who have the good name of their profession at heart.

As a layman, I feel great hesitation in making the above suggestions, which have not commended themselves to the committee generally, but the importance of reform in the direction indicated, though possibly with considerable modification of detail, has impressed me so strongly during the course of the inquiry, that I have not felt at liberty to sign the report without any reference to them.

FRANK MOWATT.

We have signed the report, but desire to state that we prefer the scheme for the distribution of business suggested by Mr. Justice Pearson to that adopted by way of preference by the committee. The proposed division into branches while requiring, as it is admitted to do, that actions should not be assigned to a particular judge before trial, but only to a branch consisting of two judges, has been devised specially with a view to keeping each chief clerk attached to a particular judge and preserving the system, theoretically, but not really prevailing at present, of every judgment being worked out by or under the supervision of the judge who tried the action, no other judge being competent ordinarily to deal with the case at a subsequent stage. This is a system the maintenance of which, whatever might otherwise be urged in its favour, it is impossible to reconcile with the arrangements which in our opinion are requisite for the expeditious and proper despatch of the business in chambers. If this proposal were to be adopted, leading counsel could no longer practice in one court, but must take briefs in both the courts of some branch, or in other words, must practice in two courts, one of which would be closed on two days of every week.

On the other hand, the scheme of Mr. Justice Pearson does not, in our opinion, interfere with the present usage of leading counsel practising only in a particular court. It provides a judge at chambers every day to hear, with or without counsel, all applications then ready for hearing (including applications in any action after judgment, whoever may have been the judge that tried the action), and two courts sitting continuously every day to try witness actions with three to dispose of other business, the intention being that each of the several judges of the Chancery Division should for a convenient period preside in each of the different courts and sit at chambers in his turn, an arrangement which for various reasons we consider desirable. Further, it renders possible the amalgamation of the several chambers with consequent uniformity of procedure and many other desirable reforms not otherwise practicable.

J. STIRLING.
M. I. JOYCE.

SOCIETIES.

THE UNITED LAW CLERKS' SOCIETY.

ANNIVERSARY FESTIVAL.

The fifty-fourth anniversary festival of the United Law Clerks' Society was held on Wednesday evening at Willis's Rooms, the Right Hon. Lord Halsbury taking the chair. Amongst the guests were:—Messrs. J. Addison, Q.C., M.P., Gainsford Bruce, Q.C., R. A. Bayford, Q.C., F. W. Bush, Q.C., A. M. Channell, Q.C., John Clerk, Q.C., F. O. Crump, Q.C., Sir J. P. Deane, Q.C., A. R. Jelf, Q.C., A. Kekewich, Q.C., F. W. Maclean, Q.C., M.P., the Rev. Dr. Ainger (Reader of the Temple), Messrs. W. F. A. Archibald, Seward Brice, W. T. Barnard, T. E. Bankes, E. J. Castle, W. Croft, G. H. Devonshire, J. H. Devonshire, W. Graham, R. P. Hardy, E. B. Johnstone, Saml. Kearns, G. Lewis, R. Melville, R. Oswald, J. W. Phillips, T. J. Pitfield, H. Roscoe (President of the Incorporated Law Society), C. J. Room, H. E. Stansfield, C. C. Scott, Dr. A. Boyle Thompson, C. G. W. Trollope, Sidney Woolf, T. Stevens, R. V. Williams, W. E. Hume Williams.

The society was established in the year 1832 by a few managing clerks who had long witnessed with pain the distressed condition of many of their fellow-clerks when deprived of health or past labour, and also the sufferings often endured by their widows and families on their decease. A fund was created by small monthly contributions, out of which relief was to be afforded in sickness, pensions granted to aged and infirm members, and assistance given to the families of deceased members. A benevolent fund was also founded to assist distressed clerks, whether members or not, their widows and families, with small gifts of money, and, under certain restrictions, this assistance is afforded to all deserving law clerks and their families whose distress is the result of unavoidable misfortune. Among the benefits are:—A weekly allowance in sickness of £1 1s.; pension payable weekly, varying from 10s. to 14s.; a payment on a member's death of £50; on the decease of a member's wife a payment of £25; to provide members with medical advice and medicine. The last report congratulated the patrons and members on the continued success of the society, for although they were not able to present so favourable a report as that of last year, still they could announce that on the whole the work of the society was steadily progressing. The society had felt the effect of recent legislative enactments and the rules made thereunder affecting conveyancing and other legal business, and the effect also of the general depression, many members of the profession having been compelled to reduce the number of their clerks. The society for many years had obtained a considerable sum annually from the fees paid by clerks obtaining situations through its agency; but this source of income had disappeared, the amount received last year being 8s. only. Forty-eight new members had been admitted during the year. There were now forty-one members receiving superannuation allowances, thirty-five of them getting £36 8s. a-year each. The cost last year was £1,391 12s. During the year fifty-one members had received weekly payments—generally 21s.—while ill. This benefit cost during the year £507 4s. 6d. The total cost under this head for fifty-four years is £16,050 2s. 6d. Sixteen members and nine members' wives had died during the year, the amount paid on this account being £1,015 (above the average). The total amount of such claims paid in fifty-four years was £26,866 13s. 11d. The aggregate amount of the relief afforded to members and others since 1832 had amounted to £84,401 1s. 5d. The committee deeply regretted to have to record the death of two of the patrons of the society—the Earl of Redesdale and Mr. Justice Pearson, who had both joined the honorary stewards for the present festival.

The CHAIRMAN proposed the health of the Queen, followed by that of the Prince and Princess of Wales and the other members of the Royal Family, observing, with regard to the latter toast, that he was disposed to think that there were few people who recognised fully the fact of what the Royal family were amongst us—they did not sufficiently appreciate what they might be, and how grateful we ought to be for the example which was set us by the Royal family. It was a very difficult thing to live the life of a prince. The

burning light which beats upon the throne beats with ten thousand times greater force on those who surround the throne in its immediate neighbourhood. And when we saw the members of the Royal family loyally striving to do their duty, we did not sufficiently appreciate the value of such an example, and the debt of gratitude we owed to them all.

The toasts having been honoured with the customary loyal enthusiasm,

The CHAIRMAN proposed the toast of the evening, "Prosperity to the United Law Clerks' Society." He congratulated both himself and those who were present upon seeing this ample room filled to its capacity, and filled by members of the profession to which it had been his great pride and pleasure to belong. He never felt himself so much at home as when he found himself among those with whom he had been, in a certain sense, at home all his life. He wished for their own sake, as well perhaps for the sake of the profession, that the outside world knew as much about the profession as did the members of it, because in that event he thought they would be able better to appreciate the extent of their obligations to them. When things worked very easily and smoothly, they were taken as a matter of course. Nobody was grateful that the sun rose, when it did condescend to rise in this climate, because it was of course. And so it had always occurred to him that the administration of justice in this country was something like one of those wonderful and magnificent machines, with its arms of steel and heart of fire, working its way, and almost working with human intelligence, but all depending upon the accuracy with which it had been manufactured, and the precision with which each part was enabled to work with the rest of it. A single screw loose, a nut off, might prevent the machine working, and might reduce the whole thing to a mass of ruin. And if it were not that each member of the legal profession, in his vocation, contributed to the harmonious working of the whole, he thought the outside world would then begin to appreciate what it would be not to be able to rely upon a profession such as it was their proud privilege to belong to. He remembered some five-and-twenty years ago—and perhaps they would think it strange when he told them what he was about to relate, that he should select an example of bad faith, a breach of trust, to point the moral which he wished to enforce—but he remembered some five-and-twenty years ago being counsel in a case in which the possession of very large estates indeed was dependent upon the fact as to whether an estate tail had been properly barred. A clerk who had had the custody of certain deeds had found out a blot in the title, and conveying his information to one of those delightful societies which he (the Chairman) would rather not characterise, an action of ejectment was brought against persons who had been in possession for something like half a century, and who had paid every farthing of the purchase-money for that purpose. Nevertheless, the defect in the title, had it been established, would have been fatal to their right to possess the property. The point of the anecdote had no reference to the ultimate result of the case, but he might tell them that the gentleman had only half learned his lesson, and had not really understood that the plaintiff in ejectment had to make out his own case first before he called upon his adversary to prove his case. He failed, and was non-suited. But that was by the way. The point of the anecdote was this—how many an opportunity of that sort must have existed in this country, but how rarely had the opportunity been taken advantage of by a faithless clerk. During the course of a somewhat active professional life, it was the first and only instance that he had ever known of professional confidence having been betrayed, and when one thought of the opportunities which, in the ordinary practice and conduct of the profession, it was impossible to guard against, and when it was remembered that if the blue bags of all the clerks in the profession were examined and exposed to the scrutiny, say of the London correspondent of a provincial newspaper, where would be the security of title, the peace of families, the harmony of domestic life, but for the unspeakable honour of the profession to which he belonged? The confidence reposed by everybody in his lawyer had never been, so far as he knew, to any extent betrayed, and our lives, our properties, and that which would, perhaps, with many families, be valued more than life or property—the reputation and the honour in which they had been held—were confided with perfect security, not only to the heads of firms, but to those who faithfully kept the secrets of their employers, and were, as he had said, as necessary adjuncts of the great profession of the law as the screw to which he had compared them, or as the minor, though not less important, parts of that great machine, the administration of justice in this country. Having said so much about the value of the profession to the outside world—that was to say, to all those who were not of the profession—he must say a word of the value of the institution in whose honour they were met together this evening. He was afraid he was bound to admit that, whatever the profession might think of themselves, what he had just described was not the estimation in which they were held by everybody else. For a considerable period in the literature of fiction the wicked attorney had been a favourite villain, and of course all that depended upon him or formed part of his professional arrangements partook of his general wickedness and malignity. In somewhat later times the idea of the wicked barrister had rather prevailed, and it seemed to him that modern writers of fiction never ceased to apply their energies in depicting the barrister who was entirely unscrupulous; and the night before hearing from the murderer in his private room that he had committed the murder, was disposed the next day to attribute to his nearest and dearest friend that he was the guilty party. Those were the pleasant fictions which people read, and which were bound in three volumes, and more or less read by the general public; but, as a matter of self-defence, the members of the profession, and more particularly its humbler members, must take care of themselves, because he was afraid that if they did not, that being the sort of outside feeling about the profession, nobody else would take care of them, and they were in a more special manner, therefore, bound to look after each other. They were at all events bound together by that bond of union of mutual respect and regard which he unfeignedly said in his case, and he believed it was true of nine-tenths of the members of the profession, embraced each member from the barrister to the junior clerk of the solicitor with whom he had ever come in contact. It would, perhaps, be a very undesirable thing for other reasons if members of the profession should be taught to look outside for sympathy. The ordinary feeling, the true feeling, of self-help and self-defence, as in every other profession, ought to make itself felt. But the membership of this institution involved no sacrifice of self-respect or independence. Each man became a member and provided by his subscription for the future contingencies, when it might be that failing health and advancing years, which, sooner or later, came to all of them, and, in the case of the humbler members of the profession, carrying with it unfortunately failing means, involved the necessity of making some provision for that period of life which, as he had said, sooner or later came upon all. And he was happy to believe that, in the profession generally, there was that sort of feeling of clanship, of association—call it what they would—which made us all desirous to help those who exhibited a sturdy desire to help themselves. In saying those words that they were all desirous of helping each other, he could not help referring to two losses which they had recently experienced in the death of the late Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords and the late Mr. Justice Pearson. Of the noble earl who had for so long presided over the private business in this country with untainted honour and the firm determination to do right, he would only say that those who had only known him as an objector to private Bills, insisting upon everything being heard with the utmost punctiliousness, they had only known the half—and perhaps not the most amiable half—of the man; they had known his firm determination to do right, they had known less his kindly and affable nature. With respect to Mr. Justice Pearson, he had to speak of him as an old and dear friend, one who had made his mark as one of those great judges who show what an English judge can be, both in his knowledge of jurisprudence, but more than all in his independent determination to do right; it was impossible to speak with too great sorrow. Both these gentlemen would have been stewards on the present occasion, but death had deprived the festival of their countenance. And now he would like to say one word—perhaps not the most encouraging word of all—about the constitution of the society. The society was one of those institutions which was placed, he believed, upon a sound basis, but which necessarily from its nature, as time went on, had larger and larger draughts upon its funds. The society had endured for more than half a century, and from time to time it had been able to gather together funds adequate to meet all their liabilities; at the same time it was impossible not to observe that, as time went on, time itself was against them as their liabilities enlarged, and as they would culminate in the necessity of providing, as they did most nobly provide, for the sick and the suffering, for those who had lost their main support, and for those who were only temporarily disabled. In proportion as their numbers increased, so in proportion would the necessity of providing for those exigencies increase; and though he wished to speak in no disparaging tones, and he would not—nay, he could not—despair as long as he saw such a gathering as this; but it must be remembered, on the other hand, that law was a luxury, and it was only in times of good and prosperous condition of all trades that law flourished; and the law, like every other luxury, had been suffering depression, which had invaded a great many homesteads from which before suffering was absent. Under these circumstances it was their duty to themselves and to the profession to take care that that great profession should not be unprovided for in times of depression and distress. He had thought it right to mention their circumstances to them, not to discourage their energy in the conduct of the good cause, because their presence to-night was a sufficient guarantee for that, but to make known to others who were not here that if they wished to aid and assist that great profession, there was no better investment for the future benefit of the profession than the Law Clerks' Association, the health of which he had the honour to propose.

The health was drunk upstanding, and with three times three.

Sir J. P. DEANE, Q.C., proposed the health of the chairman, remarking that it had been his good fortune for many years to be connected with him, and referring to his career in the profession, speaking of him in eulogistic terms.

The toast was cordially received, and with great cheering.

The CHAIRMAN returned thanks in a few genial sentences, and expressed the hope that the good feeling he had always borne to the profession would continue as long as he lived.

Mr. GAINSFORD BRUCE, Q.C., proposed the toast of "The Bench, the Bar, and the Profession." He said the bench were a body of men entitled in every way to our respect. They were a body of men who, for their learning, for their independence, for their high character, for their earnest desire to do justice, were not surpassed by any body of public servants. There was no Englishman who was not proud of the traditions of the English bench, and there was no one present who would not say that those who now sat upon the bench were worthy of the name and fame of those who had gone before them. For the present judges the society should have the warmest esteem, for there were few of those who were now occupants of the bench who had not done the society the honour at one time or another of presiding at their annual festival, showing how deeply they were interested in it. The profession of the law in all its branches was a profession of which they might well be proud. There was no branch of the profession in the discharge of the duties of which they would not find full employment for the mind, in the honourable discharge of which they would not find full discipline for the moral character, and in which they would not have an opportunity of conferring the greatest and the highest benefits upon those whose character or whose property might be intrusted to their care. They sometimes heard of attacks upon the profession. Let them never forget that the profession existed for the public, and just in proportion as it served the public welfare, so it was discharging its high duty. If they wished to protect and defend the profession, let every man in the profession, whatever his rank, take care that he should studiously discharge his duty, that he should have a punctilious regard to

honour, and then he feared not from what quarter attacks might come—then the profession, root and branch, would flourish for ever.

Mr. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS responded for the bar. He observed that there was one respect in which a junior was peculiarly qualified to return thanks on behalf of the bar. Juniors were brought very much in contact with the clerks, and thus they found themselves placed under obligations to the members of the profession who were clerks in the profession. He was sorry to say, that time after time it occurred that one had to trespass on their patience and their good nature when they were kept waiting at judges' chambers and other things of that sort. When he thought of the wonderful kindness with which one was treated in that respect, he felt that the junior bar really had a great deal to thank the clerks in the profession for. More than that, when one remembered that business had to be done at judges' chambers frequently in the greatest hurry, and when there were no vouchers or papers, and they had to take the statements of the clerks, his experience was that they ought always to receive these statements in perfect confidence and security that they would turn out to be well founded, and they might act upon them, and they never found themselves deceived. He was delighted to see that the profession was united. They all felt bound together; they all felt that union was strength, and at this time and in these days it was a great thing, and people should recognise that union was strength.

Mr. H. ROSCOE (President of the Incorporated Law Society) returned thanks on behalf of the solicitor branch of the profession. Without attempting to place the solicitors on a par with the bar, he claimed that they had an important position to fill in the great legal world, and he trusted and believed in his heart that in that position they did their duty to society, and that they were of use in the generation in which they were born. He would not go further than that, but he thought that so far he should carry them with him. Although the solicitors ceded the higher position to the bar, he thought that the bar would find it difficult to do without them. Although when it came to fighting out the cases in court the solicitors stood aside, and let the bar do that work for them—and he for one should be very glad that that work should be always done by the bar—he thought that the bar would admit that they were to a very great extent indebted for the instructions they received to the solicitors, and that without them they would be in very great difficulty in dealing with their cases. But he would say further, that if solicitors were without their clerks, they would be in still greater difficulty. There was no solicitor present who would not admit that if he and those whom he represented were not faithful, were not intelligent, and were not to be trusted in the way they were trusted, that the solicitors would be in as great a difficulty without them as the barrister would be without the solicitor. In fact, they were all members of one great body, and they worked into one another's hands, and he trusted they did so, not in the interests of themselves only, but also in the great interests of the profession to which they belonged; and that they did so in a straightforward, honourable, and intelligent manner. It was only on that ground that they were entitled to the kind consideration they received from their clients, and after all the public were their clients, and knowing as they did that these clients placed the most implicit reliance upon their solicitors, and placed their most cherished interests unreservedly in the hands of their solicitors, and that those solicitors necessarily and without hesitation placed those same interests in the hands of their clerks, he asserted that that spoke highly, not only for the solicitor branch of the profession, but also for the clerks they employed, and whom they trusted as they would one another. He had had considerable experience of law clerks, and in his experience he had never known an instance in which a clerk had been found guilty of betraying any trust that had been reposed in him. They did their duty manfully, and honourably, and intelligently.

At this point Lord Halsbury was compelled to leave to keep an engagement, and the chair was taken by Sir J. P. DEANE, Q.C.

Mr. W. GRAHAM proposed the health of the honorary stewards. When he cast his eye over the list of stewards the first thing which struck him was, that a society with such names must be doing good and useful work; and, secondly, that a society which was receiving the active support of such men, ought to receive the active support of the entire profession.

Mr. F. O. CRUMP, Q.C., returned thanks. He said he was one of the five arbitrators appointed to the society; but its affairs were so well managed that there were no disputes, and, consequently, no work for the arbitrators. The society might be said to have as proud a past as any society in this great metropolis.

Mr. F. W. MACLEAN, Q.C., M.P., in a humorous speech proposed the health of the ladies.

Mr. A. KEKEWICH, Q.C., returned thanks, and the proceedings terminated.

Donations and subscriptions were announced to the amount of £400.

A selection of music was performed under the direction of Mr. Wilhelm Ganz, assisted by Miss Amy Sherwin, Miss Alice Fairman, Mr. Bernard Lane, and Mr. Egbert Roberts, Mr. Henry Parker acting as conductor. Mr. Harker was the toastmaster.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

The annual general court was held on Friday week, Mr. John Boodle, vice-president, in the chair, when the following report was submitted:—

1. The directors have the pleasure of submitting to the members of the Law Association a report of their proceedings and the accounts for the past twelve months.

2. The directors have considered thirty-three cases of the primary class, and have distributed amongst them the aggregate sum of £1,280.

3. They have also considered numerous applications of the secondary or non-members' class which have come before them, and they have distributed the sum of £100 placed at their disposal amongst eleven cases, and recommend to the general court that a sum of £250 be placed at their disposal for distribution amongst the cases of non-members for the ensuing year.

4. The directors have the pleasure to report that they have received towards the funds of the association a further donation of £5 5s. from Messrs. Young, Jackson, & Beard.

5. The several investments now belonging to the association are as follows:—viz.,

New Three Per Cents.	£22,480 11 9
Three per Cent. Consols	2,000 0 0
Three per Cent. Reduced	2,000 0 0
India Four per Cents.	465 13 2
Great Indian Peninsular Railway Stock . .	2,500 0 0
East Indian Railway Company (Annuity Class B.)	6,837 10 0
	£36,283 14 11

6. The dividends received during the past year from these investments amounted to £1,234 1s. 7d. and with £390 12s, the amount received for the like period in respect of annual subscriptions, and £5 5s. donation, make the total income of the association derivable from these sources £1,629 18s. 7d. for the year.

7. The directors have to report with deep regret the deaths, during the past year, of the following members of the association:—Mr. Charles Sawbridge, Mr. Ralph Thomas, Mr. Frederic Boyle, Mr. L. C. Smyth, Mr. Bransby Wm. Powys, and Mr. Henry Tylee (who was one of your directors).

8. The directors are sorry to state that only a very few members have joined the association during the past year, and feel that it only needs a little personal effort on the part of individual members in explaining the objects of the association, and in inviting professional friends to become subscribers, to obtain a large addition to the list of members to this metropolitan association, and thus enable the directors to make larger grants to the numerous applicants for assistance.

9. By the regulations of the association, the president, vice-president, treasurers, directors, and auditors for the ensuing year are to be elected at the present meeting.

10. In conclusion, the directors cannot but feel that the proceedings of past years are well calculated to impress on the minds of the supporters of the association a strong feeling in favour of its continued usefulness, and the only reward they desire for their exertions in this charitable work is the approbation of the members at large, and general activity and zeal in promoting the interests of this truly benevolent metropolitan association.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. JOHN FORBES, Q.C., has been appointed Soliciter-General for the County Palatine of Durham, in succession to Mr. Gainsford Bruce, Q.C., who has been appointed Attorney-General of the County Palatine. Mr. Forbes is the third son of Mr. James Forbes, of Aberdeen. He was born in 1838, and was educated at the University of Aberdeen. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Trinity Term, 1862, when he obtained an open studentship. Mr. Forbes is a member of the North-Eastern Circuit. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1881, and he is a bencher of Lincoln's-inn.

Mr. WILLIAM LAMBERT DOBSON, Chief Justice of Tasmania, has received the honour of Knighthood. Sir W. Dobson is the eldest son of Mr. John Dobson, solicitor, of Hobart Town, and was born in 1833. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Trinity Term, 1856, where he obtained a certificate of honour of the first class. From 1861 till 1870 he was a member of the Tasmanian House of Assembly. He became Crown solicitor for Tasmania, and he was three times in office as Attorney-General. He became a puisne judge in 1870, and Chief Justice of Tasmania in 1884.

Mr. SIDNEY GODOLPHIN ALEXANDER SHIPPARD, D.C.L., has been created a Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Mr. Shippard is the eldest son of Captain William Shippard, and was born in 1838. He is a D.C.L. of Hertford College, Oxford, and he was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1867. He was Attorney-General of Griqualand West from 1876 till 1882, when he was appointed a puisne judge of the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony. He acted as British commissioner on the joint Anglo-German Commission in South Africa, and he was appointed administrator and chief commissioner of British Bechuanaland in 1885.

Mr. JOHN WOLLASTON MONTFORD, solicitor (of the firm of Southern & Montford), of Ludlow, has been appointed Clerk to the County Magistrates at Church Stretton. Mr. Montford was admitted a solicitor in 1868.

Mr. WILLIAM THOMAS HARTCUP, solicitor, of Norwich and Bungay, has been appointed Solicitor to the Norwich Union Life Insurance Society, in succession to the late Mr. Edward Field. Mr. Hartcup was educated at Rugby. He was admitted a solicitor in 1872, and he is in partnership with his father, Mr. William Hartcup.

Mr. PATRICK CUMIN, barrister, Secretary to the Committee of the Council on Education, has been created a Civil Companion of the Order of the Bath. Mr. Cumin is the eldest son of Dr. William Cumin, and was born in 1824. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, where he graduated third class in Mathematics in 1845. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Trinity Term, 1855. He was secretary to the

Scotch Education Commission in 1867, and he was private secretary to the late Mr. Forster when vice-president of the Committee of Council on Education. He became assistant-secretary to the department in 1871, and secretary in 1884.

Mr. Alexander Pearce, deputy-registrar of the Palatine Court of Lancaster for the Liverpool District, has been appointed Registrar of the Palatine Court of Lancaster for the Preston District, in succession to the late Mr. Edward Gilbertson.

Mr. Richard Henn Collins, Q.C., and Mr. John Charles Bigham, Q.C., have been elected Benchers of the Middle Temple.

Mr. Edmund Henry Wodehouse, barrister, has been appointed an Assistant-Secretary to the Local Government Board. Mr. Wodehouse is the fifth son of the Rev. Thomas Wodehouse, and was born in 1837. He was educated at Christ College, Oxford, where he graduated second class in Classics in 1859, and he was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Hilary Term, 1863. He was for several years an inspector of schools, and he has been an inspector for the Local Government Board since 1871.

Mr. Theodore Cracroft Hope, barrister, C.S.I., C.I.E., has been created a Knight Commander of the Order of the Star of India. Sir T. Hope is the only son of Dr. James Hope, and was born in 1832. He was educated at Rugby and at Haileybury College, and he has been a member of the Bombay Civil Service since 1853. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Trinity Term, 1866. He was a member of the council of the Governor-General of India from 1875 till 1880, and he was appointed minister for public works in 1882. He was created a companion of the Order of the Star of India in 1877, and a commissioner of the Order of the Indian Empire in 1880.

Mr. Henry Johnston, advocate, has been appointed Counsel to her Majesty's Woods and Forests in Scotland.

Mr. Richard Nicholas Howard, solicitor, of Weymouth and Portland, has received the honour of Knighthood. Sir R. Howard was admitted a solicitor in 1855. He is coroner for the Island of Portland. He was for several years an alderman for Weymouth, and he is now serving the office of mayor.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP.

William Jaques, Charles Edward Layton, and William Jaques, jun., solicitors and parliamentary agents, 8, Ely-place, London, so far as regards the said Charles Edward Layton. May 31.

[*Gazette*, June 1.]

COURT PAPERS.

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE.

Rota of Registrars in Attendance on

Date.	Appeal Court No. 1.	Appeal Court No. 2.	V. C. Bacon.	Mr. Justice Kay.
Mon., June 7	Mr. Koe	Mr. Lavie	Mr. King	Mr. Carrington
Tues 8	Clowes	Pugh	Farrer	Jackson
Wed..... 9	Jackson	Lavie	King	Carrington
Thursday.. 10	Carrington	Pugh	Farrer	Jackson
Friday 11	Pugh	Lavie	King	Carrington

	Mr. Justice Chitty.	Mr. Justice North.	Mr. Justice Stirling.
Monday, June 7	Mr. Beal	Mr. Pemberton	Mr. Clowes
Tuesday 8	Leach	Ward	Koe
Wednesday..... 9	Beal	Pemberton	Clowes
Thursday 10	Leach	Ward	Koe
Friday 11	Beal	Pemberton	Clowes

The Whitsun Vacation will commence on Saturday, the 12th day of June, and terminate on Tuesday, the 15th day of June, 1886, both days inclusive.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(*Continued from page* 459.)

New Trial Paper.

For Argument.

Set down 22nd February, 1886 Gloucester Vimpany v Nelmes and anr Mr H D Greene Justice Wills

Set down 23rd February, 1886 Liverpool (Liverpool D R) Public Loan and Discount Co, ld v Danson Mr C Dodd Justice Grantham

Set down 23rd February, 1886 Middlesex Kearns v Smith Mr Bruce Justice A L Smith

Set down 26th February, 1886 Middlesex Dredge v Phippard & anr Justice Grove

Set down 26th February, 1886 Liverpool Darlow, Assignee, &c v Bond & anr by original action, Bond & anr v Darlow & anr by counter claim Mr H Reed Justice Grantham

Set down 26th February, 1886 Chester Twiss, Exor, &c v Lancashire and Yorkshire Accident Insurance Co, ld Mr. C Higgins Baron Pollock

Set down 27th February, 1886 Liverpool (Liverpool D R) Critchley v Brownbill Mr Shee Justice Grantham

Set down 27th February, 1886 Liverpool Langton v Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry Co Mr Bigham Justice Grantham

Set down 27th February, 1886 Derby Hope v Evered Mr Buszard Justice Manisty

Set down 1st March, 1886 Middlesex Mac Dougal v Knight & anr Mr Pooks Baron Huddleston

Set down 1st March, 1886 Maidstone Yates v South Eastern Ry Co Mr Willis Justice Stephen

Set down 1st March, 1886 Manchester Haworth v Taylor Mr Walton Justice Day

Set down 2nd of March, 1886 Liverpool Bennett v Hughes & anr Mr Gully Justice Grantham

Set down 2nd March, 1886 Liverpool Bencke & Co & ors v Anglo-Australasian Steam Navigation Co, ld Mr Kennedy Justice Day

Set down 4th March, 1886 Bodmin Truscott v Co-operative Insurance Co, ld Mr Foote Justice Grove

Set down 5th March, 1886 Winchester Gilbert & anr v Corporation of Trinity House Sir W Phillimore Justice Grove

Set down 5th March, 1886 Middlesex Bliss v Sherwood Mr Crump Justice Hawkins

Set down 8th March, 1886 Rept of C M Roupell, Esq, Sheffield v Ratcliffe Mr C Dodd Official Referee

Set down 9th March, 1886 Middlesex Commercial Bank of Scotland and ors v Head Mr Bigham Justice Manisty

Set down 9th March, 1886 Birmingham Atkins & ors v G W Ry Co Mr Jelf Justice Wills

Set down 10th March, 1886 Lincoln Patrick, by next friend, v Ellerby Mr Graham Justice Manisty

Set down 12th March, 1886 Rept of C M Roupell, Esq Garsin v Reinhardt Mr Rose-Innes Official Referee

Set down 12th March, 1886 Middlesex Fraser v Challis Mr B F Williams Baron Huddleston Motion for judgment to be argued with this motion

Set down 15th March, 1886 Nottingham Green v Salkeld & anr Mr Bell Justice Manisty

Set down 16th March, 1886 Middlesex Hulsekopf v Aerated Bread Co ld Sir R Webster Justice Manisty

Set down 17th March, 1886 Middlesex Baird v South Lond Tramways Co Mr Kemp Baron Huddleston

Set down 17th March, 1886 Middlesex Penfold v Grosvenor Bank ld & ors Mr Murphy Right Hon Sir James Hannen

Set down 19th March, 1886 Middlesex Bryce v Rusden Sir J Gorst Baron Huddleston

Set down 25th March, 1886 Middlesex Ibberson v Neck Mr H Collins Baron Huddleston

Set down 26th March 1886 Middlesex Wyeth v Kelly Mr G Bruce L C J of England

Set down 30th March 1886 Middlesex Beningfield v Kynaston Mr Willis Justice Hawkins

Set down 16th April 1886 Middlesex Pike, Sons & Co v Ongley & anr Mr Winch Justice Manisty

Set down 16th April 1886 Middlesex Bowring & Co & ors v Roberts & ors Mr E Clarke for deft W Roberts Right Hon Sir James Hannen

Set down 16th April, 1886 Middlesex Power, Bros, & Co v Roberts and ors Mr R Clark for dft Roberts Right Hon Sir James Hannen

Set down 17th April 1886 Middlesex Cohen & Sons v Waller & Sons Mr H Collins Justice Manisty

Set down 19th April 1886 Middlesex S S Southwold Co ld v Simson Bros Mr Lockwood Justice Manisty

Set down 19th April 1886 Middlesex Huxley v W London Extension Ry Co Plt in person L C J of England
See motion to set off costs.

Set down 19th April 1886 Middlesex Pfeiffer & Wife v Mid'and Ry Co Mr Oswald L C J of England

Set down 21st April 1886 Middlesex Mott v Felbermann Mr B Rowland Justice Day

Set down 28th April 1886 Middlesex Moore v The Explosives Co ld & ors Mr Murphy for deft Co Justice Denman

Set down 28th April 1886 Middlesex Same v Same Mr Moulton for defts Justice Denman

Crown Paper.

For Argument.

(*Continued from page* 460.)

Northumberland, Tynemouth The Queen v Turnbull, Esq, & anr, Jj, &c Nisi for certiorari for conviction Ex parte Moore

Middlesex, Clerkenwell Taylor v Cooper & Kendall & anr County court Plt's motion to set aside decree H H Judge Eddis

Radnorshire The Queen v Churchwardens of Parish of Prestaign Nisi for mandamus to assemble vestry Ex parte Reynolds

Essex, Harwich Parsons v Hargreaves (Blaiberg clmnt) County Court Motn to enter judgt for clmnt H H Judge Abdy

London The Queen v Judge of City of London Court & Dittmar Nisi for prohibition to enforce payment of costs on higher scale Ex parte Beard

Devonshire, Exeter Perry & anr v Channell & ors County Court Dfts' motn to dismiss motn H H Judge Gifford

Peterborough Lilley v Mayor, &c, of Peterborough Magistrate's case

Warwickshire, Birmingham Sutton & anr v Card County Court Motn to enter judgt for plts H H Judge Chalmers

London Hyde v Walker Mayor's Court Plt's motn for new trial

Middlesex, Clerkenwell Bluck v Mather County Court Plt's motn to vary judgt

Merionethshire, Corwen Jones v Lloyd & anr County Court Motn to enter judgt for plt or new trial

Middlesex, Clerkenwell Eaton v Cripps County Court C Harcourt's motion against refusal to make charging order

Warwickshire, Alcester Wright & Son v Ratcliff County Court Motn to enter judgt for dft or new trial H H Judge

Cardiff Turner v Johnston Magistrate's case

Cornwall, Truro Coode & anr v Johns & anr County Court Motion to enter judgment for plts for £6 3s. 6d. H H Judge Beere

London The Queen v Rector of Parish of St Peter, Cornhill Nisi for mandamus to select vestry clerk

Manchester Owen's College v Overseers of Chorlton on Medlock Quarter Sessions 12 & 13 Vict c 45, s 11

Surrey, Chertsey Alexander & ors v Drewett & ors County Court Motn to enter judgt for plts or new trial H H Judge Lushington

Suffolk Kingerlee v Surveyors of the Highways, Norton Quarter Sessions Nisi to quash orders

Lancashire, Ashton under Lyne & Stalybridge Broadley v Cavendish Spinning Co ld County Court Motn to enter non-suit or judgt for defts H H Judge Hughes

Middlesex, Bow Fulda v Wilkinson & Co County Court app agst dismissal of action H H Judge Prentice
Northumberland Oubridge v Stephenson & ors, Jj's, &c Quarter Sessions Nisi to quash order
London Leggett v Surrey Commercial Dock Co Mayor's Court plt's app for judgt H H Judge
Same Prance v Allsop Mayor's Court deft's app for judgt
Middlesex, Shoreditch Freeman and Wife v North Met Tramway Co County Court plt's app for judgt H H Judge Prentice
Lancashire, Wigan McFarlane v Royal London Friendly Soc County Court plt's app for judgt, &c H H Judge Ffoulkes
Birmingham Parker v Ingo Magistrate's case
Southampton The Queen v Inhabitants of the County of Southampton Indictment deft's nisi for new trial tried before Mr Justice Stephen at Bristol
Same Same v Same Same Prosecutor's nisi for new trial
Middlesex, Shoreditch Humphries & Sons v Ratcliffe & Co County Court plt's app for judgt or new trial
Glamorganshire Stuchberry v Spencer Magistrate's case

COMPANIES.

WINDING-UP NOTICES.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.
LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

G. E. FRODSHAM AND COMPANY, LIMITED.—Petition for winding up, presented May 24, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on June 5. Whitfield, Finsbury pavement, solicitor for the petitioner
OLD CARRGWRLE FORGE COMPANY, LIMITED.—Chitty, J., has, by an order dated April 16, appointed Thomas Eli Gibson, Crewe, to be official liquidator
OLIVER AND COMPANY, LIMITED.—Chitty, J., has, by an order dated April 16, appointed Roderick Mackay, 3, Lothbury, to be official liquidator
READ, BROOKS, AND COMPANY, LIMITED.—Petition for winding up, presented May 25, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on June 5. Behrend, Bucklersbury, solicitor for the petitioner
SOUTH DURHAM BREWERY COMPANY, LIMITED.—Petition for winding up, presented May 25, directed to be heard before Kay, J., on June 5. Indermaur and Brown, Chancery-lane, agents for Mallard, Birmingham, solicitor for the petitioner
TOMLIN PATENT HORSHOE COMPANY, LIMITED.—Petition for winding up, presented May 21, directed to be heard before Chitty, J., on June 5. James, Union court, Old Broad st, solicitor for the petitioners
[*Gazette*, May 28.]
JOHN BUCKTROUT, LIMITED.—Kay, J., has, by an order dated March 19, appointed Theodore Brooke Jones, Leeds, to be official liquidator
LIVET AND COMPANY, LIMITED.—By an order made by Chitty, J., dated May 22, it was ordered that the company be wound up. Munns and Longden, Old Jewry, solicitors for the petitioners
[*Gazette*, June 1.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED.

COLNEIS HUNDRED SOCIETY, Half Moon Inn, Walton, Suffolk. May 21
LEAVENGREAVE WORKMEN'S CLUB, Leavengreave, Lancaster. May 20
NORTHERN LIGHT LODGE, INDEPENDENT ORDER OF DRUIDS, Grapes Hotel, Monkwearmouth, Durham. May 20
UNITED BROTHERS' FRIENDLY SOCIETY, New Church Schoolroom, Culcheth, Lancaster. May 25
VICTORIA LODGE, UNITED ORDER OF FREE GARDENERS, Swan Inn, Tunstall, Stafford. May 25
WINSLOW HAND-IN-HAND BENEFIT SOCIETY, Nag's Head Inn, Winslow, Bucks. May 21
[*Gazette*, May 28.]

SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS.

LITERARY INSTITUTION SICK AND FUNERAL SOCIETY, Liberal Club, Market st, Royton, nr Oldham, Lancaster. May 24
LIVE AND LET LIVE FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Cricketer's Arms, Old Basford, Nottingham. May 24
OLD VOLUNTEER SICK SOCIETY, Working Men's Institute, Carlton, Nottingham. May 24
SWALWELL REAL INDEPENDENT TENT OF RECHABITES FRIENDLY SOCIETY, Schoolroom, Swalwell, Durham. May 24
[*Gazette*, May 28.]

CREDITORS' CLAIMS.

CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

GILLETT, WILLIAM, Halvergate, Norfolk, Gent. June 18. Holt v Gillett, Bacon, V.C. Tillett, Norwich
HAMPTON, JOSEPH, Southampton, Horse Dealer. June 17. Kerley v Hampton, Kay, J. Bell, Southampton
HUGHES, ROBERT, Morfa Nevin, Carnarvon. June 16. Parry v Hughes, Kay, J. Parry, Pwllheli
JONES, THOMAS, Tyhen, Caronisclawdd, Cardigan, Farmer. June 21. Daniel v Daniel, Chitty, J. Lloyd, Lampeter
[*Gazette*, May 21.]
LILLICRAPP, GRACE, Davies st, Berkeley sq. June 21. Bevington v Bach, Bacon, V.C. Reeves, Warwick st, Regent st
[*Gazette*, May 25.
BAINBRIDGE, JAMES, Cambridge, Tailor. June 29. Matheson v Bainbridge, North, J. Wayman, Cambridge
BUXTON, HENRY, Paris, Wool Broker. June 22. Crickmer v Buxton, Pearson, J. Shepheard, Finsbury circus
MOURILYAN, EDMUND JOHN THOMAS JUDGE, Richmond, Surrey, Solicitor. July 12. Hodgkinson v Robinson, Chitty, J. Tweedie, Lincoln's inn fields
[*Gazette*, May 28.]
PARRY, SIDNEY, Murree, India, Lieutenant-Colonel, R.A. Oct 1. Parry v Parry, Kay, J. Sharpe, New ct, Carey st
[*Gazette*, June 1.]

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. CAP 36.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

BAXTER SAMUEL, Entick st, Mile End Old Town, Gent. June 24. King, Abchurch lane
BATEMAN, JAMES, Scholes, Cleckheaton, Yorks, Gent. June 1. Douthwaite, Northgate, Cleckheaton
CLARKE, THOMAS, Cogshall, Chester, Esq. June 21. Green and Dixon, Northwich
COLES, THOMAS JOHN, Oxford st, Milliner. June 24. Tidy and Tidy, Sackville st
COPPLESTONE, WILLIAM, Liverpool, Cart Owner. July 21. Priest, Liverpool
CROSSLEY, RALPH, Milnthorpe, Sandal Magna, Farm Labourer. July 1. Brown and Co, Wakefield
DAVIS, JAMES PHINEAS, Loudoun Hall, St John's Wood. June 30. Lake and Co, New sq, Lincoln's inn
EVANS, WILLIAM CULVERWELL, Gloucester, Auctioneer. Bretherton and Son, Gloucester
GARDNER, Rev JOHN, LL.D., Skelton, York. July 1. Maxsted and Gibson, Lancaster
GREENWOOD, JOSEPH, Little Gomersal, York, Joiner. June 1. Douthwaite, Northgate, Cleckheaton
HASSALL, Rev JAMES, Toxteth pk, Liverpool. June 22. Laces and Co, Liverpool
HICKS, WILLIAM LIGHTFOOT HOLEMAN, New Bond st, Court Costumier. June 30. Tatham and Sons, Staple inn
ILLINGWORTH, HELEN, Hove, Sussex. July 1. Fawcett, New Broad st
KNOWLES, RICHARD MARTIN, College rd, South Dulwich, Esq. June 21. Johnson and Co, Austin Friars
LEVY, BARNET, Liverpool, Cigar Maker. June 22. Masters and Rogers, Liverpool
LUSH, JAMES KELLEWAY, Donhead St Mary, Wilts, Brewer. July 24. Robins, Shaftesbury
LUSH, EDWIN WEBB, Donhead St Mary, Wilts, Brewer. July 24. Robins, Shaftesbury
MICHELMORE, REBECCA, Hemingford rd, Barnsbury. July 1. Buchanan and Rogers, Basinghall st
NOAKES, JAMES, Hastings, Sussex, Gent. June 26. Phillips and Cheesman, Hastings
PAGAN, JOHN THOMSON, Guildford, Surrey, Esq. July 1. Gregory and Co, Bedford row
PERKINS, FREDERICK, Jeffreys rd, Clapham, Gent. July 1. Withall and Co, Gt George st, Westminster
PHAYRE, Sir ARTHUR PURVES, Bray, Wicklow, Ireland, a Lieutenant-General. May 31. Miller and Co, Copthall ct
PICKNELL, CHARLES, Hastings, Sussex, Pierwarden. June 22. Meadows and Elliott, Hastings
PORTER, MARY, Sefton pk, Liverpool. June 25. Jones and Co, Liverpool
PRICE, ANNA MARIA, Hyde pk pl. July 1. Powell and Burt, St Swithin's lane
PROCTER, MARY, Longdon, nr Upton on Severn, Worcester. June 20. Gem and Co, Birmingham
RANCE, GEORGE, High Wycombe, Buckingham, Gent. July 1. Parker and Wilkins, High Wycombe
ROOKE, MARY STERNDALE, Keswick, Crosthwaite, Cumberland. July 16. Claye and Son, Manchester
SABEL, MAX, Mowbray rd, Brondesbury, Paper Agent. June 20. Wetherfield and Son, Gresham bldgs, Guildhall
SARGENT, ADELINE, Lordship rd, Stoke Newiogton. June 24. Bertram, Norfolk st, Strand
SCOTT, THOMAS, Upper Norwood, Surrey, Glass Bottle Maker. June 30. Moore and Co, Sunderland
SIMPSON, JANE, Beaufort rd, Chelsea. June 22. Watson and Co, Stockton on Tees
SMITH, HENRY GILBERT, Hove, Brighton. June 24. Webb and Burt, Argyll st, Regent st
SPEARING, HENRY EDWARD, Townsville, North Queensland. June 10. Bartlett, Stanhope st, Regent's pk
SUTCLIFFE, MARY, Prestwich, nr Manchester. June 30. Lawson and Coppock, Manchester
TAYLOR, AARON, Waterlooville, nr Cosham, Hants, Gent. July 7. Binsteed and Prior, Portsmouth
THOMAS, BENJAMIN, Octavia st, Battersea, Gent. July 1. Whittington and Co, Bishopsgate st Without
TINDALL, ELIZABETH CAROLINE, Preston next Faversham. Aug 2. Johnson, Faversham
TINDALL, FREDERICK, Preston next Faversham, Kent, Machinist. Aug 2. Johnson, Faversham
VISICK, ARTHUR BAXTER, Brook st, Grosvenor sq. Aug 1. Grundy and Co, Queen Victoria st
WALTER, WILLIAM HILL, Harefield. July 1. Clement-Cheese and Green, Pall Mall
WATTS, MARY ANN, Longfleet, Poole. June 24. Trevanion and Co, Poole
WRIGHT, GEORGE, Girtford, Sandy, Bedford, Wine Merchant. June 24. Monckton and Co, Lincoln's inn fields
[*Gazette*, May 21.]

SALES OF ENSUING WEEK.

June 8.—Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER, at the Mart, at 2 p.m., Freehold and Leasehold Properties (see advertisement, this week, pp. 3 and 4).
June 9.—Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, FARMER, & BRIDGEWATER, at Harpenden, Herts at 6 p.m., Freehold Properties (see advertisement, this week, p. 4).
June 10.—Messrs. HOOKER & WEBB, at Croydon, at 6 p.m, Freehold Properties (see advertisement this week, p. 8).

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS.

BIRTHS.

CARVER.—June 1, at Oxton, Birkenhead, the wife of T. G. Carver, barrister-at-law, of a son.
FILLAN.—May 31, at Roseau, Wood-vale, Forest-hill, S.E., the wife of T. Turquand Fillan, barrister-at-law, of a son.
LISLE.—May 25, at Jermyn-street, the wife of Bertram Lisle, of Alnwick, Northumberland, barrister-at-law, of a son.
MELLOWS.—May 31, at Park-road, Peterborough, the wife of W. Mellows, solicitor, of a son.

MARRIAGE.

WHEELER—REES.—May 28, at Dover, George Brash Wheeler, of 11, Queen Victoria-street, E.C., solicitor, to Lucy Palmer, daughter of the late Thomas Embery Rees.

DEATH.

WILLOUGHBY.—May 29, at 4, Bedford-square, W.C., Edward Carlile Willoughby, barrister-at-law, of 13, Clifford's-inn, aged 52.

LONDON GAZETTES.

THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1883.

FRIDAY, May 28, 1886.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

Bailey, Richard, Penge, Lime Merchant. Croydon. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 11

Beeson, George, Mill lane, Tooley st, Potato Salesman. High Court. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam July 14 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Bell, George, Wallsend, Grocer. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 8 at 11.30

Bevan, William, Stockton on Tees, Builder. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 2

Bowden, William Handcock, Gt. Yarmouth, Draper. Gt. Yarmouth. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam July 21 at 11 at Townhall, Gt. Yarmouth

Brennan, Edward, Egremont, no occupation. Birkenhead. Pet May 10. Ord May 24. Exam June 2 at 1

Burdon, Charles, Leeds, Builder. Leeds. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 22 at 11

Carpenter, Robert George, Saltash, Cornwall, Licensed Victualler. East Stonehouse. Pet May 25. Ord May 26. Exam June 25 at 11

Clinch, Charles, Rumboldswhyke, Sussex, Licensed Victualler. Brighton. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 24 at 11

Cornelius, Albert, Dawlish, Devon, Shoemaker. Exeter. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 10 at 11

Crossley, Samuel, Leeds, Boot Dealer. Leeds. Pet May 13. Ord May 24. Exam June 22 at 11

Davies, Isaac, Neath, Manager of Iron Foundry. Neath. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 22 at 11 at Townhall, Neath

Davies, Thomas, Mountain Ash, Glamorganshire, Grocer. Aberdare. Pet May 21. Ord May 24. Exam June 23 at 10.30 at the Temperance Hall, Aberdare

Davies, Walter, Queen Victoria st, Tile Maker. High Court. Pet Apr 30. Ord May 25. Exam July 7 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Douglas, Mary Ann, and John Norman Douglas, Penrith, Cumberland, Saddlers. Carlisle. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 7 at 11.30 at Court house, Carlisle

Duncum, Henry Denison, and Alfred Rutland, Great Castle st, Cavendish sq, Ostrich Feather Manufacturers. High Court. Pet May 11. Ord May 26. Exam July 9 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Edwards, Benjamin, Swansea, Grocer. Swansea. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 23

Farr, Arthur Richard, Brighton, Architect. Brighton. Pet May 25. Ord May 26. Exam June 24 at 11

Feltrup, Andrew, Derby, Confectioner. Derby. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 19

Findlay, John, Liverpool, Oil Merchant. Liverpool. Pet May 10. Ord May 25. Exam June 7 at 11 at Court house, Government bldgs, Victoria st, Liverpool

Fleming, Edward, Halifax, Currier. Halifax. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 7

Forth, Alfred Charles, Cheltenham, Colonel. Cheltenham. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 29 at 12

France, William Stephen, Wigan, Insurance Agent. Wigan. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 7 at 12

French, John, Walsall, Fruiterer. Walsall. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 9 at 12

Gorsuch, Thomas, Liverpool, Retired Farmer. High Court. Pet May 5. Ord May 26. Exam July 9 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Harding, Thomas Ridout, Frensham, Surrey, Builder. Guildford and Godalming. Pet May 19. Ord May 20. Exam June 24 at 1 at Public Hall, Godalming

Harvey, George, Queen Victoria st, Potato Salesman. High Court. Pet May 3. Ord May 26. Exam July 9 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Hemingway, Thomas, Wombwell, Yorks, Grocer. Barnsley. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 24 at 11.30

Huntingdon, William, Penzance, Confectioner. Truro. Pet May 25. Ord May 26. Exam June 5 at 11.30

Hurse, John F, Old Jewry, Accountant. High Court. Pet Apr 6. Ord May 26. Exam July 9 at 12 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Hustwait, Lewis, Wellingborough, Tailor. Northampton. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam July 13

James, James, Trealaw, Glamorganshire, Grocer. Pontypridd. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 22 at 2

Jewell, Mary Ann Vinton, Chesterton rd, North Kensington, no occupation. High Court. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam July 9 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Jones, Evan William, Pontyrhil, nr Bridgend, Grocer. Cardiff. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 8 at 2

Jones, Thomas, Llanrhaidr yn Mochnant, Denbighshire, Grocer. Newtown. Pet May 15. Ord May 26. Exam June 4

Keen, Edwin, North Audley st, Grosvenor sq, Coach Builder. High Court. Pet May 21. Ord May 25. Exam July 1 at 12 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Kiley, Roland, East Stonehouse, Devon, Herbalist. East Stonehouse. Pet May 12. Ord May 24. Exam June 23 at 11

Knight, Thomas, Oldbury, Worcestershire, Licensed Victualler. Oldbury. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 28

Laverick, Stanley Denison, Byker, Newcastle on Tyne, Boiler Smith. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 8 at 12

Lavington, Henry, Aldbourne, Wilts, Farmer. Newbury. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 16 at 2

Law, Henry, Derby, Grinder. Derby. Pet May 17. Ord May 25. Exam June 19

Lucas, J. Moore, Cheapside, Auctioneer. High Court. Pet Mar 18. Ord May 15. Exam July 8 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Mirams, Augustus, Essex ct, Temple, Barrister at Law. High Court. Pet July 10. Ord Oct 3. Exam Dec 17 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Morgan, Henry John, Abergavenny, Mon., Licensed Victualler. Tredegar. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 11 at 10.30 at County Court Office, Tredegar

Mutton, Charles, Brighton, Lodging house Keeper. Brighton. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 24 at 11

Mutton, Thomas, Brighton, Hatter. Brighton. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 24 at 11

Newton, William Henry, Leeds, Broker. Leeds. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 22 at 11

Robbins, John, West Haddon, Northamptonshire, Brickmaker. Northampton. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam July 13

Roe, Arthur Legge, Newcastle under Lyme, Physician. Hanley, Burslem, and Tunstall. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam June 11 at 11 at Townhall, Albion st, Hanley

Shott, William, Manchester, Bookseller. Manchester. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam July 2 at 11

Smith, Charles Henry, Tothill st, Westminster, Surveyor. High Court. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam July 6 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields

Smith, Henry, Eastbourne, Builder. Lewes and Eastbourne. Pet May 24. Ord May 24. Exam July 2

Smith, John, Worcester, Cork Cutter. Worcester. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 8 at 11.30

Thomas, James, Manorbier, Pembrokeshire, Farmer. Pembroke Dock. Pet May 22. Ord May 22. Exam June 2 at 11.30 at Temperance Hall, Pembroke Dock

Thompson, William, Botesdale, Suffolk, Grocer. Ipswich. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 11 at 11

FIRST MEETINGS.

Aubrey, Edward, Witham, Kingston upon Hull, Boot Manufacturer. June 8 at 2. Official Receiver, 28, Friar lane, Leicester

Balls, Charles Benjamin, Great Yarmouth, Boatowner. June 7 at 10. Lovewell Blake, South Quay, Great Yarmouth

Bell, George, Wallsend, Northumberland, Grocer. June 8 at 2.30. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne

Carpenter, Robert George, Saltash, Cornwall, Licensed Victualler. June 7 at 11. Official Receiver, 18, Frankfort st, Plymouth

Cleaver, Edward Lawrence, Church rd, Richmond, Analyst. June 7 at 2. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn fields

Clinch, Charles, Rumboldswhyke, Sussex, Licensed Victualler. June 7 at 12. Official Receiver, 39, Bond st, Brighton

Cornelius, Albert, Dawlish, Devon, Shoemaker. June 8 at 3. Official Receiver, 13, Bedford circus, Exeter

Cowdy, John James, Southwark Bridge rd, Machinery Dealer. June 7 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Cowley, Charles, Fairford, Gloucestershire, Draper. June 4 at 12. Henry C. Tombs, Official Receiver, Swindon, Wilts

Davies, Thomas, Mountain Ash, Grocer. June 7 at 11. Official Receiver, Merthyr Tydfil

Davies, Thomas Harris, Cardiff, Tailor. June 5 at 11. Official Receiver, 3, Crockherbtown, Cardiff

Douglas, Mary Ann, and John Norman Douglas, Penrith, Cumberland, Saddlers. June 7 at 12.20. Official Receiver, 34, Fisher st, Carlisle

Drummond, John, George yard, Fenchurch st, Drug Merchant. June 4 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Drummond, John Edward, Cross st, Great Sutton st, Clerkenwell, Lamp Manufacturer. June 9 at 12. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Edwards, Benjamin, Swansea, Grocer. June 9 at 11. Official Receiver, 6, Rutland st, Swansea

Farrant, Francis James, Plymouth, Hotel Proprietor. June 4 at 11. Official Receiver, 18, Frankfort st, Plymouth

Feltrup, Andrew, Derby, Confectioner. June 4 at 3. Official Receiver, St. James's chbrs, Derby

Fleming, Edward, Halifax, Currier. June 4 at 11. Official Receiver, Townhall chbrs, Halifax

France, William Stephen, Wigan, Insurance Agent. June 11 at 10.30. County Court, Wigan

Francis, Henry, Newport, Hampshire, Merchant. June 9 at 11. Bankruptcy bdgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

French, John, Walsall, Fruiterer. June 9 at 12. Official Receiver, Bridge st, Walsall

Hamel, Leopold, Basinghall st, Commission Agent. June 10 at 11. Bankruptcy bdgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Hannibal, Alfred, Dudley pl, Paddington, Boot Manufacturer. June 7 at 2. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn fields

Hustwait, Lewis, Wellingborough, Tailor. June 7 at 4. County Court, Northampton

James, James, Trealaw, Glamorganshire, Grocer. June 7 at 12. Official Receiver, Merthyr Tydfil

Jones, Stephen, Frierne rd, East Dulwich, Brick Merchant. June 4 at 2. Bankruptcy bdgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Kiley, Roland, East Stonehouse, Devon, Herbalist. June 4 at 12. Official Receiver, 18, Frankfort st, Plymouth

Kimpton, Frances, High Holborn, Bookseller. June 9 at 12. Bankruptcy bdgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Laverick, Stanley Denison, Byker, Newcastle on Tyne, Boilersmith. June 9 at 11.30. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne

Law, Henry, Derby, Grinder. June 4 at 2. Official Receiver, St. James's chbrs, Derby

Lennox, Lord Henry Gordon, Prince's gate. June 7 at 12. Bankruptcy bdgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Marsden, Benjamin, Leeds, Confectioneer. June 7 at 11. St Andrew's chbrs, 22, Park row, Leeds

McCullagh, James Samuel Gordon, Goldsmith bdgs, Temple, Barrister at Law. June 7 at 11. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn fields

Mills, George, Yarmouth, Fish Merchant. June 7 at 10.30, Lovewell Blake, South Quay, Great Yarmouth

Newton, William Henry, Leeds, Broker. June 7 at 3. St Andrew's chbrs, 22, Park row, Leeds

North, Abraham, and Joseph North, Leeds, Teazle Merchants. June 7 at 11.30. Official Receiver, St Andrew's chbrs, 22, Park row, Leeds

Ornstien, Lewis, Wyndham rd, Camberwell, Draper. June 4 at 12. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Partridge, Thomas, Birmingham, Artist. June 8 at 11. Luke Jesson Sharp, Official Receiver, Birmingham

Peate, Philip Henry, Shrewsbury, Licensed Victualler's Manager. June 15 at 3. Law Society, Talbot chbrs, Shrewsbury

Peel, Henry Clarke, Dewsbury, Chemist. June 4 at 3. Official Receiver, Bank chbrs, Batley

Penney, Harry George, Station terr, Kew Bridge, Watchmaker. June 7 at 11. 28 and 29, St Swithin's lane

Pocock, George Pearce, Ramsgate. June 5 at 12. Bankruptcy bldgs, Lincoln's inn

Rice, Henry, Times Newspaper Office, Printer. June 7 at 12. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn fields

Richards, Jeremiah, and Hannah Richards, West Bromwich, Licensed Victuallers. June 21 at 10.45. Court House, Oldbury

Ricketts, Bertie, Half Moon st, Piccadilly. June 4 at 12. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Robbins, John, West Haddon, Northamptonshire, Brickmaker. June 8 at 4. County Court, Northampton

Robinson, George, Basinghall st, Commercial Traveller. June 4 at 11. 33, Carey st, Lincoln's inn fields

Robson, Henry, Jarrow, Durham, Provision Dealer. June 7 at 11. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne

Roe, Arthur Legge, Beech Cliffe, nr Newcastle under Lyme, Physician. June 7 at 12. Official Receiver, Newcastle under Lyme

Rudall, George, Bampton, Devon, Boot Dealer. June 8 at 3.30. Official Receiver, 13, Bedford circus, Exeter

Satchwell, Thomas, Cheapside, Auctioneer. June 7 at 11. Bankruptcy bldgs, Portugal st, Lincoln's inn fields

Shelton, Daniel John, Kempston, Beds, Plumber. June 8 at 11. 8, St Paul's sq, Bedford

Shott, William, Manchester, Bookseller. June 8 at 11.30. Official Receiver, Ogden's chbrs, Bridge st, Manchester
Skene, William, West Bromwich, Surgeon. June 21 at 10.15. Court House, Oldbury
Smeaton, James, Wombwell, nr Barnsley, Boot Dealer. June 5 at 11.30. Official Receiver, Figtree lane, Sheffield
Smith, John, Worcester, Cork Cutter. June 8 at 11. Official Receiver, Worcester
Thomas, James, Manorbier, Pembrokeshire, Farmer. June 9 at 12. Temperance Hall, Pembroke Dock
Thompson, William, Botesdale, Suffolk, Grocer. June 8 at 12.30. Official Receiver, 2 Westgate st, Ipswich
Wright, William Frederick, King's Lynn, Veterinary Surgeon. June 4 at 11.30. W B Whall, Market sq, King's Lynn

The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the London Gazette of May 25.

Hobbs, Charlotte, Kettering, Pastrycook. June 2 at 11. County Court, Northampton

ADJUDICATIONS.

Beeny, William Lemmon, Eastbourne, out of business. Lewes and Eastbourne. Pet Apr 5. Ord May 25
Beresford, Andrew, Nottingham, Tailor. Nottingham. Pet May 10. Ord May 25
Bowden, William Handcock, Great Yarmouth, Draper. Great Yarmouth. Pet May 26. Ord May 26
Burdon, Charles, Leeds, Builder. Leeds. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
Cox, John, Carrington, Nottingham, out of business. Nottingham. Pet May 1. Ord May 25
Cramp, Henry, Finborough rd, Earl's ct, no occupation. High Court. Pet Mar 27. Ord May 25
Crossley, Samuel, Leeds, Boot Dealer. Leeds. Pet May 13. Ord May 26
Davies, Harry Simeon, Nottingham, Yarn Agent. Nottingham. Pet May 19. Ord May 24
Davies, Thomas, Mountain Ash, Grocer. Aberdare. Pet May 21. Ord May 24
Dodd, Tom Henry, Ravensthorpe, York, Draper. Dewsbury. Pet May 14. Ord May 25
Evans, David, Llanfihangel Rhoscorn, Carmarthenshire, Timber Merchant. Carmarthen. Pet Apr 28. Ord May 24
Feltrup, Andrew, Derby, Confectioner. Derby. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
French, John, Walsall, Fruiterer. Walsall. Pet May 24. Ord May 25
George, John, Waverbridge, nr Wigton, Gent. Carlisle. Pet Apr 20. Ord May 24
Gilchrist, Hugh Cultra, Atlantic rd, Brixton, Ironmonger. High Court. Pet Mar 11. Ord May 26
Gillatt, John, jun., Knottingley, Yorks, out of business. Sheffield. Pet May 3. Ord May 25
Glaves, Thomas Wyndham Lewis, Pontypridd, Veterinary Surgeon. Pontypridd. Pet May 18. Ord May 20
Greenwood, Thomas, and Harry Darwin, Elland, Yorks, Gas Engineers. Halifax. Pet May 19. Ord May 25
Hunt, Robert, Charles st, St James's, Gent. High Court. Pet Oct 27. Ord May 25
Hustwait, Lewis, Wellingborough, Tailor. Northampton. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
Jones, Evan William, Pontyrhil, nr Bridgend, Grocer. Cardiff. Pet May 24. Ord May 24
Knight, Thomas, Oldbury, Worcestershire, Licensed Victualler. Oldbury. Pet May 24. Ord May 25
Lester, Dorey, Cambridge rd, Kilburn, Jeweller. High Court. Pet May 6. Ord May 25
McPherson, John Robert, Sumner rd, Camberwell, Dairyman. High Court. Pet Apr 15. Ord May 26
Morrow, Timothy, Kearsley, Lancashire, Chemist. Bolton. Pet May 21. Ord May 24
Newton, William Henry, Leeds, Broker. Leeds. Pet May 24. Ord May 25
Pappa, D. G., Upper George st, Bryanstone sq, Gent. High Court. Pet Apr 7. Ord May 25
Pierson, William George, Wrotham, Kent, Farmer. Maidstone. Pet May 6. Ord May 24
Purslow, Jonathan Edwin, West Bromwich, Greengrocer. Oldbury. Pet May 19. Ord May 25
Russell, George Herbert, Bere Regis, Dorset, Grocer. Poole. Pet May 5. Ord May 24
Schumacher, Bernard, and Julius Gustavus Schultze, Fenchurch st, Rice Merchants. High Court. Pet Apr 7. Ord May 25
Shennan, John, Carlisle, Engineer. Carlisle. Pet May 21. Ord May 24
Stevens, Henry, Hamborough rd, Southall, Brickmaker. Windsor. Pet Apr 8. Ord May 25
Thompson, William, Botesdale, Suffolk, Grocer. Ipswich. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
White, Charles, Halesowen, Worcestershire, Fruiterer. Stourbridge. Pet May 10. Ord May 26

TUESDAY, June 1, 1886.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

Atwood, Edgar, Aberystwith, Cardiganshire, Solicitor. Aberystwith. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam June 11 at 1.30
Baker, Peter, Marmont rd, Peckham, Baker. High Court. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam July 7 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Baker, William Goodwin, Longton, Staffordshire, Auctioneer. Stoke upon Trent and Longton. Pet May 26. Ord May 26. Exam June 11
Brown, Robert, Nottingham, Grocer. Nottingham. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam June 29
Cheeseman, William Stookley, Brentford, out of business. Brentford. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam July 6 at 2.30
Cohen, Isaac, Manchester, Tobacconist. Manchester. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam July 2 at 11
Coverdale, Thomas, High Felling, Durham, Draper. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 10 at 11.30
Davey, George, St Mary Church, Devon, Carpenter. Exeter. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 10 at 11
Davies, Leigh T, New Brighton, Grocer. Birkenhead. Pet May 21. Ord May 26. Exam June 2 at 11
Davis, Levi, Rushall, Staffordshire, Grocer. Walsall. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam June 22 at 3
Dawson, William, Stockport, Machinist. Stockport. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 10 at 1
Dermont, Isaac, Coatham, nr Redcar, Butcher. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam June 9
Dickenson, Ralph, Coatham, Railway Agent. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 25. Ord May 25. Exam June 2
Dobson, Edwin, Workington, Milliner's Assistant. Cockermouth and Workington. Pet May 26. Ord May 27. Exam June 14 at 3.40 at Court house, Cockermouth
Ellis, Reuben, Upper Armley, nr Leeds, Mill Furnisher. Leeds. Pet May 29. Ord May 29. Exam June 22 at 11
Feaveryear, George, Pulham St Mary Magdalen, Norfolk, Farmer. Ipswich. Pet May 26. Ord May 28. Exam June 11 at 11
Freeman, Thomas, West Bromwich, Staffordshire, Baker. Oldbury. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 28
Hall, Thomas, Leicester, Tobacconist. Leicester. Pet May 11. Ord May 28. Exam June 9 at 10
Johnson, John, and Thomas Atherton Johnson, Huyton, Lancashire, Printers. Liverpool. Pet May 26. Ord May 27. Exam June 10 at 11 at Court house, Government bldgs, Victoria st, Liverpool
King, Robert, residence unknown, Builder. High Court. Pet Apr 20. Ord May 28. Exam July 8 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Kloninger, Ferdinand Otto, West Melton, Yorks, Engineer. Sheffield. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam June 23 at 11.30
Morrod, Thomas, Newcastle on Tyne, Gilder. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 29. Ord May 29. Exam June 10 at 12
Naylor, Joseph, and William Beasley, Liverpool, Cabinet Makers. Liverpool. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 10 at 11 at Court house, Government bldgs, Victoria st, Liverpool
Olivier, Henry Joseph, and Samuel Percy Wilkinson, Old st, Bag Manufacturers. High Court. Pet May 27. Ord May 28. Exam July 1 at 12.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Orton, Thomas, Atherstone, Warwickshire, Coachbuilder. Birmingham. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 28 at 2
Peach, Charles, Fenny Stratford, Bucks, Grocer. Northampton. Pet May 27. Ord May 27. Exam July 13
Pearson, Sarah, Darby End, out of business. Dudley. Pet May 14. Ord May 25. Exam June 22 at 11
Phillips, Edmund, Willenhall, Staffs, Stamper. Wolverhampton. Pet May 27. Ord May 28. Exam June 22
Potter, Marten, Faygate, Sussex, Grocer's Assistant. Brighton. Pet May 24. Ord May 28. Exam June 24 at 11
Pursell, Henry, Longton, Staffs, Potter's Presser. Stoke upon Trent and Longton. Pet May 27. Ord May 28. Exam June 11
Richardson, William, Gateshead, Builder. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 12. Ord May 27. Exam June 10 at 11
Rose, Abraham, Minories. Hat Manufacturer. High Court. Pet Apr 30. Ord May 27. Exam July 6 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Roxby, Thomas Ben, Workington, Coal Agent. Cockermouth and Workington. Pet May 26. Ord May 27. Exam June 14 at 3.40 at Court House, Cockermouth
Sheridan, Dudley Perrott, Lombard st, Financial Agent. High Court. Pet May 1. Ord May 27. Exam July 6 at 11.30 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Storry, John, Leadenhall st, Distiller. High Court. Pet May 3. Ord May 27. Exam July 6 at 12 at 34, Lincoln's inn fields
Turner, Elizabeth Sarah, Falmouth, Grocer. Truro. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 17 at 11
Wildgoose, Thomas Downing, Whittington Moor, Derbyshire, Chemist. Chesterfield. Pet May 27. Ord May 28. Exam July 8
Wilkinson, Henry Birkenhead, Coal Dealer. Birkenhead. Pet May 28. Ord May 28. Exam June 9 at 11
Windel, Conrad, Bradford, Watchmaker. Bradford. Pet May 29. Ord May 29. Exam June 22

RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED.

Ross, Joseph Robert, Throgmorton st, Commission Agent. High Court. Rescind May 27. Ord July 16

FIRST MEETINGS.

Baker, William Goodwin, Longton, Auctioneer. June 8 at 3.30. Official Receiver Newcastle under Lyme
Burdon, Charles, Leeds, Builder. June 8 at 11. St. Andrew's chbrs, 22, Park row, Leeds
Cohen, Isaac, Manchester, Tobacconist. June 8 at 3. Official Receiver, Ogden's chbrs, Bridge st, Manchester
Coverdale, Thomas, Low Felling, Durham, Draper. June 11 at 10.30. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne
Davey, George, St. Mary Church, Devon, Carpenter. June 10 at 10. Official Receiver, 13, Bedford circus, Exeter
Davies, Isaac, Neath, Manager of Iron Foundry. June 9 at 2.30. Castle Hotel, Neath
Davis, Levi, Rushall, Staffordshire, Grocer. June 10 at 10. Official Receiver, Bridge st, Walsall
Dawson, William, Stockport, Machinist. June 18 at 1.30. Official Receiver, County chbrs, Market pl, Stockport
Dermont, Isaac, Coatham, nr Redcar, Yorks, Butcher. June 8 at 11.30. Official Receiver, 8, Albert rd, Middlesborough
Dickenson, Ralph, Coatham, Yorks, Railway Agent. June 8 at 11. Official Receiver, 8, Albert rd, Middlesborough
Dobson, Edwin, Workington, Cumberland, Milliner's Assistant. June 10 at 12. Official Receiver, 67, Duke st, Whitehaven
Feaveayear, George, Pulham St. Mary Magdalen, Norfolk, Farmer. June 9 at 4.30. Magpie Hotel, Harleston
Forth, Alfred Charles, Cheltenham, Colonel. June 8 at 10. County court, Cheltenham
Furniss, Charles Strong, Liverpool, Broker's Salesman. June 11 at 12. Official Receiver, 35, Victoria st, Liverpool
Hemingway, Thomas, Wombwell, Yorks, Grocer. June 9 at 10. Official Receiver, 3, Eastgate, Barnsley
Hopg, George, Powis st, Woolwich, Watchmaker. June 9 at 3. Official Receiver, 109, Victoria st, Westminster
Huntingdon, William, Penzance, Confectioner. June 8 at 12. Official Receiver, Boscawen st, Truro
Jones, Thomas, Llanrhaiadr yn Mochnant, Denbighshire, Grocer. June 9 at 1. Official Receiver, Llanidloes
Knight, Frederick William, Lower Addiscombe rd, Croydon, Ironmonger. June 10 at 12. Official Receiver, 109, Victoria st, Westminster
Morgan, Henry John, Abergavenny, Mon, Licensed Victualler. June 9 at 3. Official Receiver, Merthyr Tydfil
Morrod, Thomas, Newcastle on Tyne, Gilder. June 12 at 10.30. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne
Naylor, Joseph, and William Beasley, Liverpool, Cabinet Makers. June 11 at 3. Official Receiver, 35, Victoria st, Liverpool
Oxley, Ransome, Sudbury, Dentist. June 8 at 4. Auction Mart, Tokenhouse yard
Peach, Charles, Fenny Stratford, Buckinghamshire, Grocer. June 10 at 4. County Court, Northampton
Phillips, Edmund, Willenhall, Staffordshire, Stamper. June 11 at 3. Official Receiver, St. Peter's close, Wolverhampton
Pursell, Henry, Longton, Potter's Printer. June 10 at 3.30. Official Receiver, Newcastle under Lyme

Richardson, William, Gateshead, Builder. June 10 at 2.30. Official Receiver, Pink lane, Newcastle on Tyne
Roxby, Thomas Bell, Falcon pl, Workington, Coal Agent. June 10 at 2. Official Receiver, 67, Duke st, Whitehaven
Stanway, John, Birkenhead, Greengrocer. June 9 at 2. Official Receiver, 48, Hamilton sq, Birkenhead
Wildgoose, Thomas Downing, Whittington Moor, Derbyshire, Chemist. June 10 at 11. Angel Hotel, Chesterfield

The following Amended Notice is substituted for that published in the London Gazette of May 25.

Davies, Harry Simeon, Nottingham, Yarn Agent. June 8 at 12. Official Receiver, 1, High pavement, Nottingham

The following amended notice is substituted for that published in the London Gazette of May 28.

French, John, Walsall, Fruiterer. June 7 at 11.30. Official Receiver, Bridge st, Walsall

ADJUDICATIONS.

Atwood, Edgar, Aberystwith, Cardiganshire, Solicitor. Aberystwith. Pet May 27. Ord May 27
Baker, William Goodwin, Longton, Auctioneer. Stoke upon Trent and Longton. Pet May 26. Ord May 26
Bevan, William, Stockton on Tees, Builder. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 26. Ord May 27
Cock, David, Roche, Cornwall, Clay Merchant. Truro. Pet Jan 29. Ord May 28
Cohen, Isaac, Cheetham, Manchester, Tobacconist. Manchester. Pet May 27. Ord May 28
Davey, George, St Mary Church, Devon, Carpenter. Exeter. Pet May 28. Ord May 28
Dermont, Isaac, Coatham, nr Redcar, Butcher. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 27. Ord May 27
Dickenson, Ralph, Coatham, Railway Agent. Stockton on Tees and Middlesborough. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
Dobson, Isabella, Fenwick, nr Stamfordham, Northumberland, Farmer. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 15. Ord May 29
Farrant, Francis James, Plymouth, Hotel Proprietor. East Stonehouse. Pet May 5. Ord May 29
Foster, Charles, Witley, Surrey, Gent. Guildford and Godalming. Pet Mar 15. Ord May 25
Fox, Robert Charles, Cirencester, Haulier. Swindon. Pet May 12. Ord May 27
Gillam, Thomas, Ludlow, Salop, Grocer. Leominster. Pet May 22. Ord May 27
Gillard, Samuel, Crediton, Baker. Exeter. Pet Apr 15. Ord May 28
Graham, Thomas, Newcastle on Tyne, Grocer. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 12. Ord May 27
Hadingham, William Edward, Mellis, Suffolk, Farmer. Ipswich. Pet Apr 29. Ord May 28
Hemingway, Thomas, Wombwell, Grocer. Barnsley. Pet May 25. Ord May 28
Hinton, James Lloyd, Welshampton, Salop, Cattle Dealer. Shrewsbury. Pet May 18. Ord May 26
Hyman, Montague, Bow rd, Mile End, Publican's Manager. High Court. Pet May 18. Ord May 28
James, James, Trealaw, Glamorganshire, Grocer. Pontypridd. Pet May 24. Ord May 27
Johnson, John, and Thomas Atherton Johnson, Huyton, Lancashire, Printers. Liverpool. Pet May 26. Ord May 27
Jones, Mary Ann, Chapel rd, Ealing, Widow. Brentford. Pet Mar 22. Ord May 27
Jones, Richard Charles, Barrow in Furness, Tailor. Ulverston and Barrow in Furness. Pet Mar 8. Ord Mar 31
Keen, Edwin, North Audley st, Grosvenor sq. Coach Builder. High Court. Pet May 21. Ord May 27
Kiley, Roland, East Stonehouse, Devon, Herbalist. East Stonehouse. Pet May 12. Ord May 29
King, Horace, King's Lynn, Norfolk, Watchmaker. King's Lynn. Pet Apr 28. Ord May 29
Klonginger, Ferdinand Otto, West Melton, Yorks, Engineer. Sheffield. Pet May 27. Ord May 27
Morgan, Henry John, Abergavenny, Licensed Victualler. Tredegar. Pet May 26. Ord May 27
Peach, Charles, Fenny Stratford, Bucks, Grocer. Northampton. Pet May 27. Ord May 27
Peel, Henry Clarke, Dewsbury, Chemist. Dewsbury. Pet May 20. Ord May 27
Penney, Harry George, Station terr, Kew Bridge, Watchmaker. Brentford. Pet May 18. Ord May 28
Phythian, Thomas, Strand, Grocer. High Court. Pet Apr 23. Ord May 28
Prior, John, Poughill, Devon, Innkeeper. Exeter. Pet May 10 Ord May 28
Pursell, Henry, Longton, Potter's Presser. Stoke upon Trent and Longton. Pet May 27. Ord May 28
Reay, Thomas, Newcastle on Tyne, Commission Agent. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 14. Ord May 28
Richardson, William, Gateshead, Builder. Newcastle on Tyne. Pet May 12. Ord May 27
Shelton, Daniel John, Kempston, Beds, Plumber. Bedford. Pet Apr 30. Ord May 27
Shott, William, Manchester, Bookseller. Manchester. Pet May 25. Ord May 28
Smith, John, Worcester, Cork Cutter. Worcester. Pet May 25. Ord May 25
Stares, James, Southsea, Grocer. Portsmouth. Pet May 7. Ord May 27
Strong, Robert Dundas, Coningham rd, Shepherd's Bush, no occupation. High Court. Pet Apr 21. Ord May 27
Tomkins, William Henry, Ventnor, Newspaper Proprietor. Newport and Ryde. Pet May 21. Ord May 25
Wallace, John, Liverpool, Marble Mason. Liverpool. Pet Apr 21. Ord May 27
Watson, Edward Johnson, Jewin st, Costume Maker. High Court. Pet Apr 20. Ord May 27
White, Henry, Sutterton, Lincolnshire, Shopkeeper. Boston. Pet May 3. Ord May 27
Wildgoose, Thomas Downing, Whittington Moor, Derbyshire, Chemist. Chesterfield. Pet May 27. Ord May 28
Wilson, William, Maryport, Cumberland, Ironmonger. Cockermouth and Workington. Pet May 12. Ord May 28
Wright James, Castleford, Yorks, Glass Bottle Maker. Wakefield. Pet May 14 Ord May 29

ADJUDICATION ANNULLED.

Duggan, Joseph, Liverpool, Model Lodging-house Keeper. Liverpool. Adjud Dec 8. Annul May 28

The Subscription to the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL *is—Town, 26s.; Country, 28s.; with the* WEEKLY REPORTER, *52s. Payment in advance includes Double Numbers and Postage. Subscribers can have their Volumes bound at the office—cloth, 2s. 6d., half law calf, 5s. 6d.*

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